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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the fire service found itself on the 
forefront of the war on terror.  The people  within the fire service began to realize 
they needed to share intelligenc e information with other government agencies in 
order to protect firefi ghters, and their community.  At the fe deral level, the 
National Information Sharing Strategy recognized that first responders are critica l 
to the prevention of terrorism and that an ef fective flow of intelligence information 
must be established between federal, state, local agencies.   
Yet, the fire service has little experi ence in the fie ld of intelligence and 
much of the intelligence available may not be specific or useful to the fire service.  
The local fire department is faced with t he task of analyzing what a particular 
piece of information means to that department.  Only the local department knows  
its procedures and locale well enough to accomplish this critical task.   
This thesis seeks to a ssist local f ire departments in building systems and 
training personnel to exploit open source intelligence for their unique needs.  
Using information gleaned from interviews  with experienced intelligence people, 
the intelligence cycle is discuss ed inc luding requirements, collection, analysis,  
and dissemination in light of the needs of the fire service.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Traditionally, the fire service wa s not a consum er of open source 
intelligence, nor was the processing of counterterrorism intelligence considered a 
normal function of local fire departments.   However, in the aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, th e fire serv ice suddenly found itself on the front 
row of the war on terror with a need to re ceive vital intelligence.   This need for 
supplying information to local governments,  including local fi re departments, was 
also recognized on t he national lev el.  Many federal docum ents, especially 
Executive Order 13356, seek t o strengt hen the sharing of c ounterterrorism 
intelligence between federal entities and local gov ernments.  Further, the 
National Information Sharing Strategy recogn izes that first responders are critical 
to the prevention of terrorism and that  an effective and efficient flow of  
intelligence information must be established  between  federal, st ate, local, and 
tribal authorities. 1  Additionally,  some fire departments such as the Fire 
Department of the City of New York (FDNY) s eek to es tablish efficien t 
information transfer arrangements between it and other governmental entities. 2  
The ultimate goal of this inte lligence sharing effort is the prevention or mitigation 
of terrorist attacks on the United States and the local community. 
“Open Sou rce Intellig ence or OSINT is u nclassified information that has 
been deliberately dis covered, discriminat ed, distilled,  and diss eminated t o a 
select audience in order to address a specific question.”3  For the fire service, the 
specific question to be answered is how is what is happening in the field of  
terrorism going to affect its operations, the safety of its personnel, and the safety  
                                            
1 National Strategy for Information Sharing (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 
2007), 3. 
2 Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy (New York: Fire Department of the City of 
New York 2007), 20. 
3 NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 
2001), v. 
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of the people they s erve.  For instance,  information available on a jihadi website 
might show an increase in the use of secondary dev ices during jihadi attacks.  
When discovered and disseminated to fire department units this in telligence may 
save the lives of firefighters and the citizens they are sworn to protect.  Currently, 
the fire service is not guaranteed access to this information or it is subject to such 
a large flow of information that this critical nugget of intelligence may be 
overlooked. 
Additionally, since most fire depar tment personnel do not have security 
clearances, the most useful type of in telligence inf ormation is open source 
intelligence (OSINT), especially sinc e most fire departments will wa nt to 
disseminate intelligence information to all of its members.  “Due to its unclassified 
nature, OSINT can be shar ed extensiv ely without comp romising national 
security.”4  The difficulty encountered with  the reception of open sour ce 
intelligence is that the fire service is gener ally not currently equipped to handle it.  
Assuming the local fire department is receiving intellige nce, the flow of 
information coming out of the Federal government and local fusion centers is 
massive and requires additional processing  by fire departments to exploit  this  
intelligence properly.  Additionally, much  of the information flow may not be 
specific or useful to t he fire ser vice.  Much of it tends to be for use by the law 
enforcement community.  Theref ore, thoug h the fire service may receive large 
amounts of open source information, it will not necessarily obtain a large amount  
of OSINT for most of the information receiv ed will be valueless.  Hence, the loc al 
fire department needs to separ ate out what it finds useful  from this infor mation 
flow.  This is called the signal-to- noise problem.  Therefore, local fire 
departments need s pecifically trained person nel and sy stems to accomplish t his 
processing and analy sis.  Most fire departments do not have the systems or the 
personnel in plac e to exploit this information flow,  nor do they have the 
                                            
4 Eliot Jardines, Using Open Source Information Effectively: Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the 
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives June 21, 2005 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 13. 
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experience to build such systems.  The proposed thesis will research the building 
of processes, and s ystems to obtain, process, and evaluate open source 
intelligence efficiently for use by the fire service. 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
How could local fire departments build sys tems and train personnel to 
exploit open source intelligence for their unique needs?   
C.   LITERATURE REVIEW  
1.   History 
Since the fire service is a new player in  the intelligence field, there is little 
written ab out its role or its u sage of intelligence.  Ho wever, the first fire 
department formally to look at the use of intelligence to support its operations  
was the F ire Department of  the City of Ne w York (F DNY).  After the Sept ember 
11, 2001 attacks, the FDNY realiz ed it needed sit uational awareness and 
intelligence on terrorism to prepare, res pond, and recover better from a poss ible 
attack.  The FDNY formalized its vision in its 2007 document Terrorism and 
Disaster Preparednes s Strategy .  The strategy states, “Terrorists have prov ed 
they are extremely adaptive and reactive to changes in  the security environment.  
Therefore, to be truly pr epared for terrorist incidents the Department must be 
adaptive to new threats . . .” 5  To this end, the FDNY began to meet with the 
Department of Homeland Security in order to discuss information and intelligence 
sharing.  “ The Depar tment of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (OI&A) and the Fire  Department of the City of  New York (FDNY) met in 
New York in fall of 2006 to discuss fire se rvice writ lar ge as partners in sharing 
homeland security information.  Both agencies agreed about the vital need to 
share information for the sec urity of the Natio n against e nemies’ h ostile 
                                            
5 Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness Strategy (New York: Fire Department, City of New 
York, 2007), 10. 
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intentions (counterterrorism information).” 6  Additionally , both agencies agre ed 
that other fire departments should be brought into the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise in order to share information horizontally as well as  vertically.  In 
addition, if fire departments kept each other  informed of what is occurring in their 
locality, seemingly  isolated incidents may show a patt ern that indicates terrorist 
activity.  To that end, fifteen major ci ty fire departments have agreed to form a 
trusted network, a “community of interest” to share intelligenc e and less ons 
learned.7 
Several theses have recently come out  of the Naval Postgraduate Scho ol 
discussing various aspects of intelligenc e in the fir e service.  Much of the 
emphasis has been on the role of the firefighter as an intelligence c ollector.  
Additionally, the Center for Polic ing Te rrorism released a report recommending 
the fire service “serve a pr eventive intelligence role.” 8  Other theses have 
recognized the need for the fire service to move from a reactive to a proactiv e 
posture by the use of intelligence in planning and training.   
2.   Open Source Intelligence 
Open source intelligence or OSINT s eeks to analyze information found in 
television broadcasts, radio broadcasts, newspapers, the internet, academic and 
scientific journal articles, commercial data, non-secret foreign governmental 
reports, and speeches by foreign politic ians.  OSINT, by definition, is  no t 
collected by illicit means.  The advantage to using open source intelligence to the 
American fire service is that most of its members do not have s ecurity 
clearances.  OSINT may be widely dist ributed within a department with only an 
“sensitive but unclassified” or a “for official use only” caveat.  Some agencies use 
an additional caveat “law enf orcement sensitive” for ce rtain specialized materials 
                                            
6 Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE): Progress Report 1, (U//FOUO) (December 28, 
2007), 2. 
7 Ibid., 4.  
8 Kyle Dabruzzi and Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counter 
Terrorism,” Policing Terrorism Report 3 (July 2008), 5. 
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that demand additional dissemination restrictions; however, the distinctions within 
the field of “sensitive but unclassified”  materials  are som ewhat artificial.   
Intelligence marked “secret” and “top secret” may be adva ntageous to  the  
highest levels of a department; however, it  will never allow situational awareness 
for the rest of a depar tment unless it ca n be “sanitized” to unclassified.  O SINT 
may also inform higher echelons of a fire department about what information they 
are lacking, allowing them to go to t he federal government for additional 
information or clarification.    
What is the value of OSINT?  The literature shows that for many traditional 
analysts, open sour ce information was a st arting point in th e collection or 
analysis of other forms of intellig ence.  OSINT is though t to create a backgrou nd 
for the analyst to help him or her underst and the issues and people involved in a 
particular matter.  However,  OSINT can also be us ed to  verif y or supplement 
other intelligence sources. 9  Additionally,  foreign newspapers and speeches  
made by a terrorist organization’s higher-level leadership may give a window into 
the collective mind of these groups.  S peeches and articles written by foreign 
policy makers may also provide insight into  their hopes and conc erns as well.  It 
may be useful in the evaluat ion of societal and econom ic trends.  It may be used 
to track dual-source technology that c ould be used in the pr oduction of WMDs 
and its s upply network.  Yet another benefit to OSINT is that sinc e it is  derived 
from open sources, it may be possible to release t he intelligence to foreign 
leaders or  the press  if benefic ial to th e United States without  revealing its 
classified sources and methods. 
There is another area of OSIN T sour ces called “gray lit erature.”  Gray 
literature consists of limit ed av ailability materials w here there are few copies 
produced.  Alternativ ely, the existence of  this type of literature may be for the 
most part unknown or has a restricted dist ribution through specific channels.  
These materials may consist of “working papers, pre-prints, technical reports and 
                                            
9 Open Source Intelligence, (U//FOUO) (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 
December 5, 2006), 2-2. 
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technical standards documents, dissert ations, data sets, and commercial 
imagery,” internal us e only  document s and articles , journals, and reports  
prepared for specific organizations or associations. 10  This litera ture is, by its 
very nature, difficult to search for and acquire; for instance, some trade literature 
available at a show and papers deliv ered at a c onferences may only  be 
distributed to those at the trade show or conference.11   
OSINT has several limita tions.  One is  that an analyst will rarely fin d 
information that foreign governments are tryi ng to hide in open sources.  In other  
words, you  will n ot generally  fin d secrets there.  OSINT will, th erefore, rarely 
supply the “‘smoking gun’ about  some issue or threat.” 12  Cons equently, OSINT 
may not be a replacement for other forms of intelligence.  It relies on information 
that is fragmentary and open to v arious interpretations.  This means OSINT must 
be fit into the larger picture.  Due to the volume of the data flow, policy makers  
must understand that the OSINT analyst may completely  miss important 
information. 
As was mentioned previously, one of  the problems with creating OSINT is 
that the amount of raw information available is v oluminous and even with 
sophisticated software, it still requires many resour ces to translate, cull, and 
convert it into a form that can be us eful in generating intelligence.  OSINT 
analysts will look for a wide range of information, ideally, from many different  
types of open sourc es in an effort to conf irm a possible piece of intelligence.  
However, having a large am ount of open s ource information will not necess arily 
give you a large amount of OSINT for most  of the information received will be  
 
                                            
10 NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 
2001), 8. 
11 NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 
2002), 25. 
12 Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2005), 67. 
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valueless (the signal-to-noise prob lem or “wheat and c haff problem”).13  The rest 
must be “filtered” and, ideally, verified before it can be passed on to other  
analysts, department policy makers, or personnel. 
An additional problem with OSINT is that, though there can be a c ollection 
strategy, the analyst has no abilit y to task its collection as can be done with the 
other “INTs.”  For example, the analyst cannot control what  foreign ne wspapers 
will print, or what s peeches t errorist groups will make, which means  the 
information the OSINT analyst needs may  or  may not be available when he or  
she needs  it.  The analyst must, instead, sit by their  stream of information and 
see what type of fish they hook.  This le ads to a further complication, since t he 
analyst has no control over its production, they must be careful in the intelligence 
vetting process bec ause the open source information received may be 
disinformation or propaganda placed there by foreign governments.  Howev er, 
for every major or minor event in t he world, at least 20 independent sources  
report on the very same event. 
The risk and possibility of misinformation or deception have grown, but the 
risk also has been reduced.  It has becom e harder for remote and clos ed areas 
of the world to keep things secr et and to fool its own citizens with propaganda. 14  
Additionally, since open source informati on is available to everybody, there will 
be pressure to releas e some analysis before, for instance, the New York Times 
does.  However, the OSINT analyst must not rush this vetting process, or the risk 
of creating incorrect intelligence increases.   
                                            
13 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2006), 102. 
14 NATO Open Source Intelligence Reader (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 
2002), 80. 
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3.   Open Source Intelligence in Homeland Security 
“In today’s complex and dangerous wo rld, US policy mak ers need 
contextual, contemporary, and relev ant knowledge to make dec isions.”15  This is 
most certainly true of the leaders hip of t he fire service in the Unit ed States.  In 
the effort to protect the homeland, whether from natural disasters or from terrorist 
attack, firefighters will be sent into harm’s way.  Their departments and the 
national government owe them the bes t training, informa tion, and equipment 
available.  Training firefighters to re spond to terrorist incidents c an only be done 
if the leadership of a department has information at hand to plan and execute 
training properly.  The same is true for the types of equipment a department 
might purchase.  Similarly, current situational awareness is critical to the safety of 
firefighters.  Awareness of an impending attack could lead to an increas e of 
staffing or changes in firefighting procedur es and response patterns.  Firefighting 
is an inherently dangerous occupation; no amount of information can eliminate 
those risks.  However, intelligenc e about the current terrorism landscape and it s 
future possibilities can reduce those risks to the extent possible. 
In his testimony before the U.S. C ongress on the value of OSINT in t he 
realm of homeland s ecurity, Eliot A. Jard ines stated, “From Pearl Harbor to the 
September 11 th terrorist attacks, intelligenc e fa ilures have largely resulted not  
from a lack of information, but  rather the inability to effectively disseminate that 
information or intelligence.” 16  Others posit, “major i ntelligence failures ar e 
usually caused by  fa ilures of analysis.” 17  He also points out t hat the us e of  
OSINT effectively by passes the problem of obtaining security clearances  for 
each first responder.  “In fact, OSINT prod ucts could be disseminated to the full 
complement of first responders  such as  firefighters, EMTs, university police 
                                            
15 Eliot A. Jardines, National Open Source Enterprise (Washington, D.C.: Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, April 2006), 6. 
16 House Subcommittee on Intelligence, information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Security, Using Open Source Intelligence Effectively, 
109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005, 13. 
17 Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 65. 
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departments, hospitals, and private security firms.  Consider for a moment what a 
paradigm shift that w ould represent.” 18  It is important to  note here that a fire 
department analyzing its own needs and require ments and attempting to fulfill 
those requirements does not mean cutting itself off from other sources of 
information such as  federal and s tate governments.  For instance, Charles Allen 
reported, “DHS Intelligence is developi ng a strong Open Sour ce Intelligence 
(OSINT) capability f ocused on  our areas of exper tise and responsibility to 
complement the broader Intellig ence Com munity’s open source  investmen ts.”19  
Fire depar tments will continue to be dep endent on  these sources as well.  
Indeed, fire departments develop ing products for their inte rnal use may want to 
release them through DHS because they ma y be of real interest to other 
members of the fire service.  
The testimony before the committee also  made it clear t hat open source 
intelligence is not a panacea nor can it  be separated from other sources of 
intelligence.20  Howev er, it is the best way to ens ure homeland security 
intelligence is as widely distributed as po ssible.  Wide  distribution ensures that 
homeland security intelligence is  in the hands of the people who can tactically  
use it.  A United States Navy Air Wing Co mmander leading the first flights over 
Baghdad said, “If it is 85% accurate, on time , and I can share it, this is a lot more 
useful to me than a compendium of Top Secret Codeword material that is too 
much, too late and needs a safe and three s ecurity officers to move it around. ”21  
This is true for homeland sec urity inte lligence as well.  Produced materials  
should be kept at a “For Official Use Only” level to ensure some level of security.   
In addition, individual fire departments need to be able to us e open source 
materials without violating an individual’s Constitutional rights.     
                                            
18 House, Committee, Using Open Source Intelligence Effectively, 14. 
19 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Reform, and Homeland Security 
Intelligence, 110th Cong. 1st sess., 2007, 4. 
20 House Committee, Using Open Source Intelligence Effectively, 4. 
21 Robert David Steele, Open Source Intelligence: Executive Overview (Global Intelligence 
Partnership Network, January 1, 2004), 21, http://www.oss.net/ (accessed April 18, 2008). 
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4.   The Intelligence Cycle 
The literature shows  that  proper intelligence, inc luding open sourc e 
intelligence, is an iterative process.  The various steps in the intelligence process 
are distinct, but inseparable, if good inte lligence products are to be deliver ed.  
This progression is called the intelligence cy cle.  There are several models of the 
intelligence cycle, however, all the models r eally involve the same concepts.  For 
instance, even within the U.S.  Army, there are different models in the literature.  
The model that appears in  the U.S. Army’s Open Source Intelligence manual 
describes a five-step model for the e xploitation of open source in telligence.  The 
five steps in this model are planning, preparing, c ollecting, p rocessing, and 
production.22  The U.S. Army Intelligence Center’s guide, Targeting Tomorrow’s 
Terrorist Today , describes five s teps beginning with Planning and Direction .  At 
this step, the possible sources of OSIN T information is identified.  Then comes 
the Collection phase in whic h the actual data is captured.  The data is then run 
through the Processing, In tegration, and Guidance phase.  Then, hopefully, 
validated intelligence is analyz ed and inte lligence products produced in the 
Analysis and Product ion phase.  Finally, the product reaches the Dissemin ation 
phase.  At this phas e, the le vel of restriction is  dec ided since finished products 
may divulge OSINT collection capabilities.23 
The United States Departm ent of Justice’s Bureau of Justice As sistance 
describes a six step cyclical process. 24  These steps consi st of “ Planning and 
Direction,” in which this step leads to the actual Collection phase; for law 
enforcement, this is the most labor-i ntensive as pect of the intelligenc e 
                                            
22 Open Source Intelligence, FMI 2-22.9 (U//FOUO) (Washington, D.C., Department of the 
Army, December 5, 2006), 3-1. 
23 Ben Benavides, Targeting Tomorrow’s Terrorist Today (T4) through Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT): Quick-Links Started Handbook for the Open Source Analyst, (U//FOUO) 
(Fort Huachuca: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, January 2007), 48.  
24 The National Criminal Intelligence Plan (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Justice, 
June 2005), 3, http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/National_Criminal_Intelligence_Sharing_Plan.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2008). 
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process.”25 The information goes  through a Pr ocessing/Collation phase.  T he 
results of that phase are put through an Analysis  phase.  Of course, analysis for 
law enforcement may be v ery different from either a nati onal intellige nce 
organization or a fire department.  Po lice analysis s hould produce intellig ence 
that gives  leads  in an inv estigation or results in pr osecution, in addition to 
preparation for and prevention of terrori st attacks. 26  The product is then 
disseminated to those within the organization  who need to know it.  Reevaluation 
of the intelligence is t hen carried out resu lting in a new period of planning and 
direction. 
Other authors such as Lowenthal propose a se ven-step int elligence 
process.27  The first step in the s even-step process is  identifying requirements.  
Requirements are the items t hat the open source process is supposed to clarify  
or on which to capture information.  Wi thin the Fire Service Intelligence 
Enterprise (FSIE), there is a Requirements Working Group, which is beginning to 
identify the requirements of the fire service.  These fall into five broad categories.  
The first category of requirement s is potential incidents and threats.  The second 
requirement was time estimates as t hese can directly impact situational 
awareness and operational readiness. 28  Third, what ar e the general protective 
measures being taken by other agenc ies and levels of government.29  The fourth 
requirement is such information that “i nforms fire service actions” such as 
protecting firefighters, their families, op erations, and mission. 30  The las t 
                                            
25 Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, D.C.: US 
Department of Justice, September 2005), 6, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdff.lesl/bja/210681.pdf 
(accessed July 7, 2008). 
26 Ibid. 
27 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2006), 102. 
28 Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE): Progress Report 1, (U//FOUO) (December 28, 
2007), I-2. 
29 Ibid., I-3. 
30 Ibid. 
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requirements set identified was  information on spec ial events, target hazard 
analysis, natural disaster vulnerability and prediction, and cyber threats.31  
This effort by the F ire Servic e Inte lligence Enterprise to ide ntify the 
common requirement s of the fire service was necessary because homeland 
security intelligence is dominated by law enforcement, while the needs of the fire 
service may be quite different.  “Several  SMEs (subject matter experts) cited the 
overall lack of inc lusion of these other disciplines (p ublic health, f ire, emergency 
medical services, and private sector se curity) at all lev els as a c ritical 
shortcoming in the development of co mprehensive, effective information and 
intelligence sharing processes.”32 
The next identified step in the intelligence cycle is collection.  Collection is  
how the necessary information to fulfill t he identified  intelligence requirement is  
obtained.  It is important to note that all that is being collected here is information, 
raw data if you will; this information is of  little value until it is processed an d 
analyzed.  Requirements should give those tasked with producing the necessary 
intelligence as sense of how critical that particular requirement  is .  This allows 
the organiz ation and the indiv idual analyst to assign a priority to its collection.   
Without such information, critical reques ts may be delayed bec ause the analyst  
is attempting to fulfill a request for intelligence that has little or lesser criticality.  
The following step, Processing, s eeks to eliminat e superfluous and 
incorrect material and to arrange the data i n a logical format. 33  In other words,  
the information is v etted and organized.  Only then can an analyst begin to 
attempt to create a coherent picture out of the availabl e information.  T his is  
where information and data become intell igence.  Intelligence can be considered 
                                            
31 Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE): Progress Report 1, (U//FOUO) (December 28, 
2007), I-3-4.  
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Lessons Learned Information Sharing, LLIS 
Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence Requirements 
Process (December 2005), 4. 
33 Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture (Washington, D.C.: US 
Department of Justice, September 2005), 7, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdff.lesl/bja/210681.pdf 
(accessed July 7, 2008). 
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a “concisely tailored answer reflecting a deliberate process of discovery, 
discrimination, distillat ion, and d elivery of data pr ecisely suited to need.” 34  In 
other words, intelligence is an answer to  a question asked by a policy m aker, 
which draws upon k nown data and informa tion, but put through a refinement 
process that adds value to existing info rmation by the input of the analyst.  The 
next part of the intelligence cycle is Dissemi nation; here, the fin ished product is  
moved to the people who r equested it or can use the material.  For instance, 
some product may be produced for the hi gher echelons of an organization for 
long-term planning and materials acquis ition.  T his would be strategic  
intelligence.  Other intelligence may be fo r day-to-day situational awareness.   
This is an example of tactical intelligence.   
The sixth step, Cons umption is  important as we ll.  Consumption means  
that the people who were supposed to  read the prepared and disseminated 
intelligence actually read it.  Finally, the people who read the intelligence respond 
to it.  In an idea l world, they let t he people who prep ared the in telligence know, 
“what has been useful, what has  not, whic h areas need continuing or increased 
emphasis, which can be reduced and so on.” 35  Additionally, the intelligenc e 
product may raise additional questions in the consumer’s mind, which, in turn, 
may lead to further requests for intelligenc e.  These new requi rements start the 
intelligence cycle again. 
D.   ARGUMENT: MAIN CLAIMS, WARRANTS, EVIDENCE, AND 
CHALLENGES 
September 11, 2001 changed the world in many ways.  Agencies, such as 
the local f ire department, that had never  considered themselves targets of  
terrorist a ttacks, now found themselves on the front line of defending t heir 
country and their community against terro rist attacks.  This was ne w and 
                                            
34 Robert David Steele, Open Source Intelligence: Executive Overview (Global Intelligence 
Partnership Network, January 1, 2004), 3, http://www.oss.net/ (accessed April 18, 2008). 
35 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2006), 64. 
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uncharted territory to the fire service.  The ability of the fire service to execut e its 
sworn duty to protect life and property in the local comm unity, as well as, to the  
extent possible, protect the firefighter s who serve there from the consequences 
of terrorism, is dependent on t he efficient usage of intelligence.   The fire s ervice 
requires homeland security intelligence for everything from planning to resp onse 
and mitigation.  Fire departments, out in the community on building inspections or 
responding to routine emergencies, may be  able to pr event terrorism with good 
intelligence that leads to situational awareness.  Currently, most fire departments 
have no sy stems in place for effectively collecting, analyzing, and dissemination 
open sourc e intelligence for their own us e.  Developing a syste m wherein fire  
departments can properly exploit useful open source in telligence would enhance 
firefighter safety and add to their ability to prevent terrorism in their community 
and more efficiently respond to and mitigate such an attack if it occurred. 
Some might argue that having an in-house system in the local fir e 
department to exploit open source intelligence is wasteful or unnecessary or both 
as counter-terrorism intelligence ma y be supplied by the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligenc e and Analysis or by their local police 
department or by their regional fusion c enter.  Evidence will show that while 
these flows of infor mation ar e not to  be ignored, they are primarily  law 
enforcement oriented and not ne cessarily useful to a lo cal fire department.  In 
addition, the flow of in telligence from the above-mentioned agencies must still be 
further analyzed to dis cover what is most applicable to the lo cal fire department.  
The needs  of the fire service are differ ent from other agencie s.  Others might 
posit that the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) will solve a local 
departments intelligence needs.  The FSIE is certainly a st ep in the right 
direction; however, this system still does  not address the needs of the  fire  
department in its local community.  An additional alternative might be to place fire 
service personnel in the local fusion cent er.  However , in some areas wher e a 
local fusion center per  se does not exis t and given the uneven quality and intent 
of local fusion centers, this may not be a viable alternative. 
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E.   SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The immediate cons umers of this research will be fire departments and 
other government agencies that are non-tr aditional c onsumers of open source 
intelligence such as public healt h entitie s.  The research will lay out a “game 
plan” by which fire departments can effectively develop, disseminate, and employ 
open source intelligence to support prevent ion, planning, and op erations in  the 
post 9-11 environment.  The research will also be useful to government agencies  
that might be tasked with supporting the fire service with homeland sec urity 
orientated intelligenc e.  Homeland security  practitioners will gain ins ight into 
setting up an effective system for the coll ection and use of OSINT in agencies 
outside the intelligence and law enforc ement communities.  Finally, private 
entities, such as hos pitals, and  utilities,  may find this research valuab le in  
creating intelligence systems useful with a view to protecting their facilities from a 
terrorist attack or dealing with the after effects of such an attack.   
 16
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II.   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis  will study  the use of inte lligence in the fire service from a 
qualitative research approach.  The study will use qualitative interviews foc used 
on understanding processes and building the frameworks required for a fire 
department to use intelligence in order to protect life and  property in the 
community they serve.  This is  what is referred to i n the literature as “topica l 
interviews.”36  What is most import here is fo r the researcher to find subject  
matter experts of suffi cient experience as to be able to  shed light on a particular  
problem or  issue.  In this particular ca se, little research has been done on the 
problem of intelligenc e use by the fire se rvice, so the researcher must interview 
experts in other field of intelligence and apply the k nowledge gained to a fire 
department intelligence unit. 
A.   INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
The problem of intelligence use by  the fire service was studied by  
qualitative analys is because the field is not well researched, which means it is 
difficult to “generate hypotheses and develop quantitative measures.” 37  To this 
end, five interviews of  approximately one hour each were conducted with subject 
matter experts (SMEs) in the field of intellig ence.  Each SME had  a minimum of 
fifteen years of experience in the intelligenc e field.  Indeed, the average length of 
experience with intelligence is over 20 year s.  Intervi ewees wer e intentionally  
drawn from a wide range of intelligence backgrounds so that the problem of 
intelligence use in the fire service could be viewed from a variety of perspectives.  
Two interviewees ser ve with the federal government.  One has a background in 
open so urce intellig ence; the o ther has a forty-year backgrou nd in  milit ary 
                                            
36 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing The Art of Hearing Data 2nd 
ed. (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005), 11. 
37 Gail Fann Thomas, “Research Methods: Qualitative Data Analysis,” 2, 
https://www.chds.us/courses/file.php/279/lecture_transcript/6-
res_methods_qual_datas_analysis_transcript.doc?forcedownload=1 (accessed January 22, 
2009).  
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intelligence.  The third interviewee is a senior level chief in local law enforcement 
and h as a  thirty-three year b ackground in po lice in telligence.  Two  hav e a  
background in privat e sect or intelligence.   The res earcher conducted initial 
interviews between November 4, 2008 and November 25, 2008.  The resear cher 
personally performed all depth qualitative interviews.  They were all conducted by 
telephone and recorded for accuracy.  The interviews were later professionally  
transcribed into a Word document format.   
The interviews were s tarted by using what Rubin and Rubi n referred to as 
a “hypothetical example.” 38  The question was, “If you suddenly f ound yourself 
tasked wit h the mission of starting a fi re department intelligence unit from 
scratch, how would y ou go abo ut it?”  This question was designed to allow the 
interviewee to talk freely about their take  on the issue of the research ques tion.  
Additionally, broadly worded main questions were prep ared as a  framework to 
insure all concepts gleaned from the literature were covered and that each part of 
the topic was thoroughly explored. 39  These follow-up questions were allowed t o 
evolve as  each prior interview was anal yzed.  This process of theoretical 
sampling was continued until all five inter views were completed.  Theoretical 
sampling kept the interviewing process open to changes in direction as  indicated 
by the data itself. 40  In addition to the main and follow-up questions,  continuation 
probes were used to expand the depth of  detail and elabor ation probes were 
used to connect and further explore the themes and concepts covered by the 
main quest ion.  From the existing data, gaps were noted and f ollow-ups to the 
interviews were carried out via  e-mail.  Answers to follow-up  interviews  were  
received between November 26, 2008 and January 19, 2009.   
                                            
38 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing The Art of Hearing Data 2nd 
ed., (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005), 161. 
39 Ibid., 135. 
40 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008), 144. 
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Mr. Burton is one of the world’s foremo st authorities on security, terrorists,  
and terrorist organizations.  In his capacity as Vice President for 
Counterterrorism and Corporate Security at Stratfor, Mr. Burton oversees the 
firm’s terrorism intelligence serv ice and cons ults with clients on security-related 
issues affecting their organizations or personal safet y.  He leads a team of  
terrorism experts and a glo bal network of human intel ligence sources to ana lyze 
and forecast the most significant event s and trends related to terrorism and 
counterterrorism. 
Mr. Burton is the author of Ghost: Confessions of a Counterterrorism 
Agent, a story of his role in the burgeoni ng terrorist threat in the 1980s and 
beyond. 
Before joining Stratfor, Mr. Burt on served as a special agent in 
counterterrorism for the U.S. Department of State, where he was involved with 
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intelligence, and law enforcement agenc ies, providing consulting on global 
intelligence and threat identification. 
In addition, Mr. Burton has revolutionized the field of security by designing 
a unique and specialized prot ective program to safeguard CEOs, their fami lies, 
employees, and phys ical facilities.  His st rategy is highly valued and has been 
implemented by governments and a number of the world’s leading corporations. 
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intelligence operations. 
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magazine, The New York Times  and the Wall Street Journal  and quot ed in 
reference to global issues in t he New York Time s, USA T oday, Fortune, 
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U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI ) Open Sou rce Center (OSC).  In this 
recently created position, Mr. Johnson see ks to facilit ate relation ships that will 
leverage all forms of openly  available information to r esult in homeland s ecurity 
insights, actions, and impact.  Open source  intelligence includes: text, broadcast, 
video, dat a, geographic, and  internet derived informa tion.  Open Source 
intelligence is a valuable source for anal ytical understanding, early warning, tip-
offs, and event detection and tracking—espe cially topics with a foreign aspect 
impacting homeland security, such as te rrorism, bi ological hazards, cyber 
threats, weapons of mass destruction, and narcotics trafficking. 
Mr. Johnson is a professiona l geographer, intelligence officer, former U.S. 
Army officer, and senior manager whose 28 -year federal career has centere d on 
the use, collection, exploitation, and creation of open source information.  Prior to 
his current assignment, Mr. Johnson dire cted the only center in the U.S.  
intelligence community focused solely on open source geospatial materials—the 
OSC Map Services Center.  His assignments over the years have taken him from 
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a Master of Information Syst ems from Virginia Tech a nd has frequently written, 
taught, and spoken on intelligence topics. 
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commentary, NightWatch™.  He has taught strategic analysis and warning to the 
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United States Air Force Intelligence Analysis Agency. 
Mr. McCreary has worked intelligence for both the U. S. Government and 
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by dNovus  RDI as Director of Na tional Intellige nce and Ana lysis and was 
 22
appointed Vice President for Intelligence Analysis  in Ma y 2007.   He served the 
United States government from 1968 to May 2006 as an intelligence analyst  with 
the Defense Intelligence Agency.  From 1998 to May 2 006, he served as Senior  
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national security.  He has als o written “The Latest Intelligenc e Crisis,” wit h 
Richard A.  Posner in Intelligence and National Sec urity, Volume 23, in 2008, 
Intelligence as Evidence, a J2 monograph published in 1996, Analysis of Political 
Instability, a J2 monograph published in 1995 and “Warning Cyc les” in Studies in 
Intelligence in 1983. 
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Polytechnic Univ ersity in 1996, and rece ived a Mast er of Arts from the Naval 
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C.   QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Qualitative analysis of these interviews us ed open c oding hand-in-hand 
with axial coding. 41  Theoretical memos were also used.  Making comparisons  
and asking “practical” questions to build theory were the major methods of  
analysis in this project. 42  Building sensitivity,  defined by Corbin and Straus as  
“insight, being tuned in to, being able to pick up on relevant issues, events, and 
happenings in the data,” were also an im portant part of t he qualitative analysis  
process.   
1.   Coding and Analysis   
A hybrid approach was tak en in coding the interviews.   This  hybrid model 
is part way between a responsive interview formal coding schema and  grounded 
theory models in that not every term wa s coded, but only concepts and themes 
that were closely related to the research question were selected.43  The literature 
was reviewed in order  to acquire underst and of the themes and concepts that  
should be coded. 44  A grounded t heory appr oach was used where the themes  
and concepts were allowed to emerge fr om the data.  Line-by-line open coding,  
the breaking apart of data in order to gener ate addit ional concepts and themes  
that may not have appeared in the literature, was performed. 45  The researcher  
gathered data and analyzed it conc urrently.  This also a llows the development of 




                                            
41 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008), 198. 
42 Ibid., 72 - 73. 
43 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd 
ed. (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005), 223. 
44 Ibid., 221. 
45 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008), 198. 
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and analysis, meanings and significance of data, often illus ive at first, becomes  
clearer and the researcher  begins to see the issues and problems from the 
perspective of the participants.”46   
Data acquired from the interview tran scripts, e-mails, and the researcher’s  
field notes were coded and reviewed until coherent pattern s began to emerge.  
This analy sis was  performed by “constant  comparison.”  In this  methodology, 
“incidents found to be conceptually s imilar are grouped  together under a higher-
level descriptive.”47  Constant comparison was nec essary because it allowed t he 
researcher to distinguish the various themes and concepts.  Data was broken 
down into “informant codes,” which were  aggregated into hi gher order analytic 
codes and finally second order codes, and more general categories and themes, 
were induced (See Figure 1).  Theoretical saturation was not reached due to time 











                                            
46 Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 3rd ed. (Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2008), 32. 
47 Ibid., 73. 
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Usability                       
Honesty                            Relevancy                              Keeping it Real   
Quality                              Reliability 
  
Figure 1.   Emergent Analytical Codes and Categories 
2.   Writing 
The data from the interviews was  interpreted by the researcher in light o f 
the needs  of the fire service without getting too far from the ide as a nd 
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experiences of the s ubject matter exper ts.  Most importantly, the researc her 
sought to avoid a theoretical appr oach and instead attempted to provide useable 
information arising out of the first hand ex perience of the involved intelligence 
professionals.  It is the researcher’s f ondest hope that this thes is is actionable by 
the fire service in underst anding and using intelligence.   In writing this thesis, the 
advice of Rubin and Rubin has been fo llowed, which is  to use extensive 
quotations from the interviews in order to make the interviewees real.48 
                                            
48 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd 
ed. (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005), 252. 
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III.   DATA ANALYSIS 
A.   INTELLIGENCE 
1.   Purpose 
What is the purpose of forming a fire  depa rtment intelligence un it?  Th e 
answer is simple; to protect the me mbers of a department  and the community  
they serve.  Francis  Bacon, the 17th century English philosopher, once said that 
knowledge is power.   The fire service has always  known this to be true.  
Firefighters learn hydraulics, building construction, emergency medicine, line 
placement, hazmat, and so many other topics bec ause this knowledge gives  
them the power to do their jobs proper ly.  “Good information allows for good 
decision-making.  Bad information or a lack  of information a lways results in  poor 
decision-making.”49.  A n intelligence unit has the same function, except in the 
field of terrorism.  When asked what he saw as the purpose of a fire department 
intelligence unit, Fred Burton replied, “Well, you’re going to make your 
department better educated, better informed, better trained, more cognoscente of 
the life safety threats, the risks you run.   With an intelligence shop, you are going 
to make your fire fighters smarter and y our command staff better informed.  You, 
at the end of the day, may ev en save li ves by having analyt ical ass essments 
done on your first due response areas.” 50  Later in the interview, he explained it s 
all about, “life safety, meaning we are going to create an intelligence analy tical 
capacity within (the department) in order to save lives, period.  We’re going to 
serve the civilian population better because we ’re going to do intelligence-led fire 
fighting ver sus reactive fire fighting.” 51  This is the ultimate purpose of any fire 
department intelligence unit. 
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Of course, having a fire department intelligence unit does not guarantee 
safety and there are costs to having suc h a program.  So, why do it?  Speak ing 
of terrorism, George Friedm an stated, “Most of it won’t come here (the United 
States).  And some o f it may come her e (and) we will not be  p repared for it.  
What you’re trying to do is cut the odds down.” 52  Intelligence is  not a panac ea.  
It is not foolproof; however, intelligence has a real value, perhaps life saving 
value, to the local fire department and every department from the largest 
municipal agency to the smallest vo lunteer organization should have an 
intelligence unit or at least an int elligence officer who looks at terrorism and says  
how might this affect my department; how might this affect my locale?  “The point 
is that good intelligence is cheap in a sense that it doesn’t hav e a tremendous  
amount of bells and whistles.”53   
Fire departments should be thinking a bout and planning their response to 
a potential terrorist attack.  They owe it to themselves and to their communities.  
Unfortunately, terrorism is going to be around for a long time.  The intelligence 
unit or officer should also be used in st rategic and tactical  planning as an 
information source.  For instance, hotel s have become a major terrorist target  
around the world.  They are a s oft target that is easy  target.  There have been 
major terro rist attacks against hotels in  Amman, Jordan, Islam abad, Pakistan, 
and Mumbai, India.  The attacks have caused craters in the street interfering with 
the positioning of ap paratus, mass causalities, gas leaks, fires, and structural 
collapse.  What are your  department’s plans if an attack should happen in your 
city, town, or village?  Developing plans to respond to such a situation at a hotel 
or other soft targets in your response ar ea is one of the times brainstorming and 
the involv ement of several chief o fficers may be required; however, the 
intelligence office should be able to find a lot of information on these attacks and 
the damage that they cause.  This will  help a department keep its planning 
realistic.  How many  hotels or other soft targets exis t in your geographic  area?  
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Do you have floor plans, and s ite m aps?  Does y ou department know what 
auxiliary fire protection equipment is presen t?  What is the back-up plan if thes e 
systems are rendered inoperab le?  All these items can be collected by the 
intelligence office for planning purposes. 
2.   Open Source Intelligence  
Though se cret and to p secret in telligence may, at first, seem to be  the  
most attractive, it is not the most useful form of intelligence for the fire service.   
Since most fire department personnel do not have s ecurity clearances and the 
process of getting clearances is long and cumbersome, the most useful type of 
intelligence information is open  source in telligence ( OSINT), especia lly s ince 
most fire departments will want t o disseminate received intelligence information 
to all of its members.  “Due to its unclassified nature, OSINT can be shared 
extensively without compromising national security.” 54  Information that cannot  
be shared with the units in the field may have limited value. 
The interviewees were almost unanimous in their belief that secret and top 
secret intelligence was not required for the fire service.  Howev er, even 
unclassified open source intelligence may cr eate difficulties for the average fire 
department because most are not currently equipped to handle it.  Assuming that 
the local fir e department is receiving intelligence, the flow of information coming 
from the Federal gov ernment and local fusion centers may be massive and 
requires additional processing by fire depar tments to exploit th is intelligence 
properly.  This is bec ause, currently, much  of the information flow is not specific  
or useful t o the fire service.  Much  of  it tends t o be for use by the law 
enforcement community.  Hence, a loca l fire department needs to put an 
analytical mechanism in place to separate out what is useful from this information 
flow, the signal-to-noise problem.  Ther efore, the local fi re department needs  
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specifically trained personnel  and systems to acco mplish this  processing and 
analysis.  Most fire departm ents do not have the sys tems or the personnel in 
place properly to utilize OSINT, nor do they have the experience to build such 
systems.  The interviewees gave of their time and the benefit of their expertise in 
order to help the fire service build thos e systems.  The following chapter s are 
meant to assist a fire department that  sees the value of good intelligence and 
situational awareness to begin to build the required structures and expertise.   
3.   The Intelligence Cycle  
Even though the intelligence cyc le is somewhat of an artificial construct, it  
has been used in this thesis  because it provides a us eful framework in which t o 
discuss intelligence.  All of  the steps of the intelligence cycle may be going on at 
the same time; some steps may not be as clear-cut as they are made out to be in 
the literature.  It is important  to remember that the int elligence cycle is iterative.  
The products a unit develops may lead to  other questions and then to other  
products.  Nevertheless, an intelligence unit needs to give s ome thought about  
each of these steps in or der to produce a worthwhile  and useable product.  In 
addition, it will allow pers onnel in a fire department  intelligence unit t o 
communicate using a common language wit h intelligence analysts in other fields.  
This intelligence cycle architecture was cert ainly helpful in the interviews with the 
subject matter experts.  Figure 2 presents a descriptive précis of these steps, 
including some illustrative quotes.   
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Figure 2.   Stages of the Intelligence Cycle: Description and Representative 
Quotes 
“So, I would try to do it 
through the existing 
(mechanisms), you don’t 
want to necessarily set 




”So, yes, try(ing) to 
penetrate and infiltrate 
the existing process is 
probably a good initial 
approach at least.” 
 
“Have a method for 
disseminating it 
(intelligence) not only to 
the fire department but to 
the police as well so that 
they can be alerted to it 




“For each article we put 
up on our web site 
anyone reading that can 
respond and ask a 
question, make a 
statement, whatever, and 
once they hit the send 
button it comes to our 
customer service team 
who are not the experts, 
but they will immediately 
pass it off to the author or 
someone else who knows 
about the subject matter.” 
“I think at some point you 
have to have a human 
analyst who knows fire  . . 
. and maybe teamed up 
with someone who knows 
the intelligence industry.” 
 
“If you box people in with 
too many rules, and 
regulations, and 
standards then you lose 
free expression, you lose 
free thinking, and there is 
the innovative thinking.” 
 
“You have three or four 
smart guys . . . who love 
sitting at computer 
screens 12 hours a day 
and discerning patterns.” 
 
“Curiosity would be a 




division, for example, 
could provide you with 
some very concise 
warnings and indicators.” 
 
“Your threat to mid-town 
is different than Wall 
Street, and it’s different 
from Brooklyn and it’s 
different than Harlem.” 
“At the outset it’s 
probably better to just 
plug in to the wealth of 
people at the federal and 




“You have to know what 
is happening in 
Amsterdam; you know 
the latest techniques that 
have been used in Cairo.  
You must maintain a 
constant global watch on 
technology.” 
 
“Firefighters see a whole 
lot of things that are or 
could be reportable and I 
think they need the 
method or the means to 
get that to the right 
people.” 
   
The US is not going to be 
the place where attacks 
are pioneered.  They are 
pioneered in (other 
countries); they are field 
tested there.  So you 
need to be aware of 
evolving trends before 
hand.” 
“Sit down with a few 
people and brainstorm.” 
 
“What you need to do is 
look for is the next way a 
terrorist might hit you.” 
 
”So, what you are trying 
to do with an analytical 
shop is not so much 
approaching it from a 
requirement basis, but 
you are trying to inform 
your . . . chain of 
command on issues that 
they have no knowledge 
of.” 
 
“There will be some 
lessons learned from 
what happened in places 
like Bombay, what 
happened in Spain.” 
 
“I would advocate 
simultaneously talking to 
all levels (of a 
department) to determine 
what their needs are.” 
 
“I think you’ve got a really 
tricky problem because . . 
. the firefighting 




Dissemination is the 
delivery of intelligence 
products too those who 
need it.  Part of the 
dissemination process is 
the request for feedback.  
Feedback helps with 
quality control and allows 
consumers to ask 
questions.  These 
questions may become 
requirements for which 
the intelligence unit 
begins to collect 
information. 
Dissemination 
Analysis is the process 
by which raw information 
is developed into 
intelligence.  This 
happens when analysts 
add their skill and 
expertise to the 
information.  They add 
depth and perspective to 
the raw data.  Analysis 
tries to answer the 
question, “What does this 
fact or incident mean to 
this fire department. 
Collection is the process 
of obtaining the 
information needed to 
fulfill the requirements set 
by a department or 
information assembled in 
those areas that the 
intelligence unit thinks is 
important.  Collection 
may come from outside 
or from within a fire 
department. 
Requirements attempt to 
define the needs of the 
consumers of intelligence 
within a department.  In 
other words, an 
intelligence unit tries to 
identify and prioritize 
what intelligence will 
assist a particular 
department in the 
discharge its duties. 












B.   REQUIREMENTS 
The most important step in the inte lligence cycle is to define what a 
particular organization or policy maker needs to know.  No other step in the cycle 
can be performed until these needs are est ablished and all the work that might 
be put into the subsequent steps  of the intelligence proc ess is wasted if policy  
makers and the members of a department get junk information because no wel l 
thought-out intelligenc e needs have been est ablished.  Setting requirement s is 
not only the most important issue a d epartment needs to determine, but als o 
generally, the most difficult one.  It is an even more diffi cult question for the fir e 
service since intelligence requir ements need to be defined on  a local lev el and 
the local fire department often the  lacks the experience with intelligence to tackle 
this task.  As John McCreary said, “I thin k you’ve got a really very tricky p roblem 
because . . . the firefighting challenges are not the same everywhere.” 55  Yet, the 
question of defining in telligence requirements is critical and needs to be carefully  
considered by the local department. 
The intelligence professionals inte rviewed had sever al ideas on how a 
local fire department should b egin to define its intelligen ce requirements.  Not all 
of the interviewees agreed with each other on how they would perform this  
function; however, almost all stressed it s importance.  On the other hand, the 
ideas they tendered were not necessarily mutually exclusive; a local department  
may wish t o try a blended ap proach, using several ideas  below to establish its  
requirements.  Departments should not be afraid to c hange its requirements 
creation pr ocess if the exis ting system is not working as  well as it should.   
Additionally, a department can and must update its requirements as the l ocal 
environment evolves. 
1.   Brainstorming    
Brainstorming is  an important part of this process.  One of the 
interviewees said that if he wer e hired to start an intelligenc e office for a fire 
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department he would “sit down with a few people and brains torm.”56  As an 
outsider coming into t he fire ser vice, he would take “some time to observe, and 
listen, and talk to the people who do the work, not only the firefighters on the line 
but the inv estigators;” “this is pr etty much step one.” 57  Mr. Johnson po ints out  
that each level of  command has  their own need and he advocates, 
“Simultaneously talking to all of these levels to determine what their needs are.”58  
Only then, can one c onnect the thought s and determine where information can 
be effective in helping a de partment fulfill its role in  protecting a community  
against terrorism. 59  This is good advice f or anyone tasked with deciding a 
department’s intelligence requir ements, even those experienc ed in the fire 
service. 
2.   Freedom  
Another school of thought says, “in essence, they (the l ocal fire 
department) don’t know what they don’t know, meaning how do you create a 
requirement based upon an intelligence gap?”60  In other words, it is very difficult 
for a department to set its requirements, si nce “it doesn’t know what it doesn’t  
know.”  Fred Burton stated that a department might know where every hydrant is  
on a street, and send someone out to test them and make notifications if one is  
down, “but you may not be aw are of the real threat t hat lies on that street. ”61  
How does one solve t his problem?  T he answer is pick good analysts and allo w 
them the freedom to discover the real thre ats.  These analyst s pick their issues  
without undo interference from the hi gher echelons  of a department.  “What 
you’re doing with an analytical shop is  not so much appr oaching it from a 
requirements based ( system), b ut trying to inform y our managers and y our 
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bosses and your chain of command on i ssues that they have no knowledge of  
whatsoever.”62  In other words, rather than trying to set up formal requirements, a 
department is really dependin g on its analysts to come up with answers to 
questions that nobody has thought of as yet.   
These two systems are not necessarily  in oppos ition to each other.  A 
department could establis h som e formal r equirements for its analytical unit to 
handle.  These would be established th rough brainstorming and discussion with 
each level of a department in order to see what in telligence is necessary to 
respond to terrorism as safely as  is possible.  Yet at the same time, the analysts  
could be given the freedom to answer ques tions that nobody has asked, but that 
the analytical team thinks is  important.  This is b ecause a department may need 
“to know those things that somebody hasn’t sat around and thought of” yet.63 
The alternative to loc ally defining r equirements is to allow other agencies  
to give whatever intelligence they deem relevant and hope that the fire 
department receives the right information.  This school of thought says that since 
fire departments may not have their own analysts, they “should be receiving 
properly analyzed and corroborated informa tion, unless that information relates 
to an imminent incident or threat.” 64  On the other hand, locally s pecific, wel l 
thought-out intelligence requirements would als o help the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal entities fulfill their missions within the 
National Information Sharing St rategy, wh ile not ov erwhelming the local fire 
service with large quantities of information of limited relevancy.    
3.   Guidelines   
Below are some addit ional ideas on helping a loca l department establish 
what it needs to know.  First, any inte lligence requirement produced by the fire 
service must support its core mission.  The core mission of any fire department is 
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protecting life and sec ondarily protecting property in t heir community; these are 
the raison d’être of the fire service.  For instance, the “the core mission of the 
FDNY is life safety.” 65  If the proposed req uirements do not directly support a 
department’s mandate to protect life and pro perty, they are faulty.  For instance, 
knowing the strategic balance between the United States and a resurgent Russia 
may be important, even critical , to the national securit y of the United States, but  
such intelligence is probably not necessary  for the fire service to protect the 
citizens of its local community.  On the other hand, a department may want to 
know about the latest terrorist attacks in India. 
Further, intelligence is  not primarily an intellectual exercise, mean ing that 
the information requested should not be “interesting,” but “useful.”  Therefore, the 
second standard for a fire servi ce intellig ence requirement is that it should be 
useable.  Lowenthal makes t he point that policy makers “seek intelligence that is  
actionable intelligence, that is, intelli gence with which they can do  something.”66  
This desire for actionable intelligence is just  as true for the fire service.  Henc e, 
intelligence that has no practical application is of little value to any department.   
The third r equirement for intellig ence is  timeliness.  Intellig ence must not 
be received after it is  no longer useful.  The timing of in telligence may be broken 
into two broad categories.  Long-term intelligence should be more in depth and 
looks at what may happen in one month to several years.  Long-term intelligence 
is also known as st rategic and operational level intelligence.   This type of 
intelligence is useful to the fire service because it allows for longer term planning 
for equipment purchases; it allows time  to create and implement necessary  
training, and permits drills to be c arried out.  Additionally, departments can craft 
better standard operating procedures if it has an idea of how terrorist groups may 
act.  Short-term intelligence involves warnin gs of an imminent attack.  Short-term 
or tactical intelligence may cover the peri od of one day or less to several weeks.  
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In this period, there may be little occasion for a department to prepare thoroughly  
for the attack.  However, staffi ng leve ls may be increased a nd curtailm ent of 
nonessential fire service activities initiated.67   
Given these provisos, what kinds of intelligence does the local fire service 
need?  The answer is simple; a local fi re department needs good situational 
awareness.  The department needs to know  what is going on in the world of 
terrorism.  What is happening s trategically and tactically with terrorist groups?  
This information may come from other countries or it may cover what is  
happening in the Unit ed States.  Most importantly, what is the possib ility of an 
attack on their local community?  How will it most likely h appen?  Are there 
changes in terrorist tactics that the fire service shoul d know about?  Are t here 
signs or warnings of  imminent attack?  What types of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) are being used around the world?  How are these IEDs being 
used?  For  instance, George Friedman stat ed, “What you need t o look for is the 
next way a terrorist might hit you.  Okay so cell phone detonat ed bombs, well 
they are old hat now, but coming along is s ome other really nasty thing.” 68  This 
is what the local fire se rvice needs som eone to be look ing f or.  Is there an 
increasing amount of secondary attacks?  Have there been attacks specifically 
against fire departments?  In other words,  what is going to hurt your department  
and the people you serve?  
Attacks from around the world need to be ex amined in light of a local fire 
department’s community.  A department needs to lo ok at the implications  of 
foreign and domestic attacks with an eye to how that particular department 
operates.  Attacks that take plac e in t he United States will probably have been 
tested in other parts of the world.  “As part of this effort,” a department should 
realize “there will be s ome lessons learned from what is happen ing in places like 
Bombay, and what happened in Spain.”69  
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Weapons of mass destructi on are another area of conc ern.  Though they  
may have a low probability of use, they have the potential for high causalities  as 
well as pot ential for extensiv e property and economic damage to  a locale.  Any 
long or short-term intelligence f ederal or state agencies can supply may  help 
departments prevent, prepare for, or mitigate such an attack. 
Cyber attacks, though they may not seem  like a fire service issue, may  
adversely affect the fire department of  a community.  Many fire departments 
dispatch their units by computer assi sted dispatch s ystems.  Any damage to 
those systems would force a retu rn to manual dispatch systems, which are more 
labor intensive.  Departments may need to  assign additional dis patchers to their 
communications office to prevent t he collapse of dispatch oper ations.  
Additionally, many forms of cyber attack may hugely increase  utilizatio n of 
departmental assets.  For instanc e, more and more elevators are being  tied into 
centralized computer system s fo r operation, maintenance, and repair.  A cyber  
attack on these computers may result in literally thousands of people being 
trapped in elevators and r equesting fire department as sistance.  Cyber attacks 
on utilities may cause similarly  widespread problems.  Any intell igence that could 
either help departments to pro tect its systems or give it forewarning of targeted 
attacks may help it prepare to respond. 
Another in telligence requiremen t is th reats to infrastructure.  This 
intelligence should not be limited to a par ticular city or town because most 
locations are dependent on such things as  water and electricity from outside its  
own borders.  This information may a llow a depar tment to do contingency  
planning on how it will operate if it lost the use of a specific infrastructure.  One of 
the most important things  a department needs to k now about is threats to their 
water supply.70  Firefighting activities generally come to an end without water. 
In summary, although some interview ees distrusted formal requirements,  
an example list of fire service intelligence requirements could be the following. 
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• Situational awareness and terrorist threats 
• Improvised explosive devices 
• Weapons of mass destruction 
• Cyber attacks 
• Threats to infrastructure 
C.   COLLECTION 
Does a fire department need to go out and begin its own raw collection?  
In other words, does the fire serv ice need to hire and r un agents on the street?  
The answer, of course, is no; that is not w hat this thesis  is suggesting.  It would 
be both cost prohibitive and inappropriate to  attempt this kind of  collection.   In 
addition to the potential legal difficulties,  it would be beyond the scope of the fire 
service’s mission to attempt to do s o.  So, then, how does a fire department 
intelligence unit find information in order to fulfill its mission?  It might be less of a 
problem than most thi nk.  I ndeed, the real problem is not  so much that there is  
not enough information out there; the problem is that there is too much data.  The 
difficulty is  that “there is too much in formation out there to make sense of it 
logically because today we are inundated with information.”71 
1.   External Sources 
The information to c ollect is that whic h supports the fire service’s  mission 
to protect l ife and property in its loca l community.  Therefore, a good plac e to 
start is to have an in telligence unit or in telligence officer liaison  with the local 
police department.  The local police usually has a finger on the pulse of the local 
community.  There may be state and loc al police in a particular area and a f ire 
department should m ake contac t with all of  them.  In addition t o being able to 
supply information that may be of use to a department, the personnel inv olved 
become familiar to ea ch other.  Then if an emergency occurs, the agenc ies are 
not strangers but have, idea lly, already built a lev el of trust with each other.  Pat 
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Miller stated, “Because they (the polic e department) are tied into so many  
different systems that the fire department isn’t, that’s where you need to start.”72   
All appendices are restricted. 
The next set of people to make cont act with is the U .S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Protective Securi ty Advisors (see Appendix A).  “In 2004,  
the Risk  Management Division (RMD) Field Operations Branch (FOB), 
established the Protective Securit y Advisor (PSA) Program, deploying a cadre of 
68 critical infrastructure security spec ialists, with an average of 20 years of law 
enforcement, military, and anti-terrorism experience, permanently assigned to 60 
metropolitan areas designated as PSA districts across the United States.”73  One 
of the areas where a fire  department’s intelligence uni t can be helpful to its  
department is in the area of cr itical infrastructure in a l ocal community.  Where is 
it?  What a re their da ngers?  W ould this facility create any sp ecial difficulties in 
firefighting or hazmat response if  it were  involved in a terrorist attack or other 
disaster?  The intellig ence unit should be asking these questions.  Pre-
operational planning should result from this resear ch.  The local PSA is a 
valuable source of information and can ma ke introductions where necessary to 
local critic al infrastructure operators.   This is  signific ant because local 
infrastructure operators are e xperts with uni que insights into their  facilities; they  
are an important resource.  Additionally, PSAs act as a line of communica tion 
between the loc al community  and the Department of Home land Security in the 
area of potential thr eats, and they ca n help with exercise design in their  
geographical area.  T he intell igence unit c an use this assistanc e if it is c alled 
upon to set up drills for its department.   
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Additionally many stat es have homeland security  departments.  A fire 
department intelligenc e unit should ma ke contact wit h them and see what 
services these agencies might have av ailable.  “The homeland s ecurity 
(agencies) at the stat e level . . . have a broader view  of things and they ar e not 
just law enforcement, they’re also first responder.”74 
Next, the intelligence officer of unit s hould make contact with the local or 
regional fusion c enter (see Ap pendix B).  They may well  be a great source of  
information.  However, the unit shoul d not become overly  dependent on the 
fusion center alone.  There are several prob lems with the fusion centers.  One is  
that their future is uncertain.  In addi tion, the quality and scope of their work is  
uneven.  There is a saying that goes, “Y ou’ve seen one fusion center, you’ve 
seen one f usion cent er.”  In other word s, each fusion center  is  unique bo th in 
terms of what it fuses and in terms of how  well it does it.  The other problem is 
that fusion centers tend, wit h few exceptions, to be l aw enforcement focused.  
“And everybody else including the fire department is kind of a second team.  If 
they participate they do, but  we (the fusion centers) don’t care if they don’t.” 75  
Some of the interviewees also questioned the usefulness of many of the products 
the fusion centers generate to emergen cy personnel on the street.  Others 
thought they might be useful.  “Fusion centers can be useful provided ever yone 
shares information.  Across the country, you will find v arious opin ions as to the  
usefulness due to turf issues.  I see duplicate efforts in a lot of places.” 76 Due to 
these limitations, a f usion cent er shoul d not be a department’s  only  sou rce of  
information.  
This is  not  to say that one should not contact and use the local fusion 
center.  An analysis unit absolut ely should.  Indeed, one suggested alternative to 
a fire department having its own intelligenc e unit is  to  plac e firefighters in the 
regional fusion c enter as analyst s.  “A  couple of people who hav e a firefighting 
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background” could “establish a firefighti ng intelligence desk or s omething at the 
fusion center and their job would be to look through all the flows of information 
coming in a pull out the relevant  things to the firefighters, to the first responders, 
and the allied disc iplines.”77  Some fusion centers are doing this.  However, that  
still leaves the nee d for the loca l fire de partment intelligence un it to look  at the  
materials posted by their fusion center and see how it applies to their  
department, with its particular infrastruc ture, and its particular policies and 
procedures.   
There is a wealth of information and processed intelligence available on 
the internet (Appendix C).  Most of these web sites require that a department  
apply for access to them.  The information they contain is voluminous and covers 
just about every aspect of terrorism.  For instance, the Overseas Ad visory 
Council (OSAC) does  good analysis of what  is happening around the world and 
creates excellent PowerPoint presentations on major terrorist atta cks around the 
world.  “You have to know what is happening in Amsterdam; you have to k now 
the latest techniques being used in Cairo.   You must maintain a constant global 
watch on technology.”78  A department needs to “watch the technologies that ar e 
evolving in other parts of t he world.  The U. S. is not going to be the place where 
attacks are pioneered.   They are pioneered in (other c ountries) – they are field 
tested there.  So you need to be aware of evolving trends before hand.” 79  This 
knowledge should support one’s training for a response to a terrorist incident.   
Others like the Universal Adv ersary Port al contain s informati on on terrorist 
groups and information that is helpful in exercise planning.  This includes terrorist 
groups that operate within t he United States.  This is because a fire department 
must also look within the country at terrori st trends as well.  “9/11 showed us y ou  
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can’t just focus on overseas; a focus only on overseas does n’t necess arily 
guarantee security.” 80  Still others  sites contain information on such topics  a s 
critical infrastructure and weapons of mass destruction.   
The Open Source Center (https://www.opensource.gov/) site is especia lly 
helpful because it has  a subscrip tion service that will e-mail the intelligence  unit 
materials that they request.  This is an ex ample of a pull s ite; the user pulls what 
they think useful to  their organiz ation.81  A fire departm ent analyst should think  
about the subscriptions they might find us eful.  Certainly, words such as “fire 
department,” “arson,” “fire bombings,” “improvised incendiary devices,” and 
“terrorism” should be included in the subscription.  Additionally, an analysis unit  
should request that the O pen Source Center send them anything that mentions 
the name of their state or lo cality.  Two entities are espec ially useful to the fire 
service because they are more fire re lated than most sites.  One is  the 
Emergency Management and Respons e In formation Sharing and Analysis  
Center site (EMR-ISA C), which is run by t he U.S. Fire Administration.  This site 
will send e-mails and infogr ams with emergency sector specific intelligence and 
information.  Chief Officers may receive Sensitive CI P Notices, which are  “For 
Official Use Only.” 82  The other is Watch Line, a product of the Fire Department  
of the City of New York’s  Center for Terrorism and Dis aster Preparedness.  The 
Center produces it weekly and is a good vehicle for fire departments that are 
trying to improve their situational awaren ess.  Almost all of the information in 
Watch Line is useful to the fire service. 
The members of the intelligenc e and  analysis unit should always be 
making connections.  Every time members of  the unit go for trai ning, every time 
its members go to a conference, talk to  other people at the training ev ent, the 
speakers, and the instru ctors; make contacts.  Get a business  card if possible;  
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file the card.  Jot a few notes about the person or agency on the back of the card.  
Do not just do this for other fire departments.  A department might want to do this 
with federal and polic e agencies, infrastructure operators,  the radiation hygienis t 
at the loc al hos pital.  The unit  must  use its imagination.  Get anyone and 
everyone’s card.  You never know when that contact might help your department.  
Thus, if a question arises or  some thing happens in an other locale, the 
intelligence unit can contact that person and get the straight story.  It is  
suggested that this be done ev en if it is nec essary to make contact with another 
fire department in another state.  On the flip side, have a business card available 
and giv e it  out.  Help where possible.  Networking can be invaluable to an 
intelligence unit.  
Lastly, some of the interviewees sugges ted that the intell igence unit could 
collect raw material right off of the inte rnet.  For instance, Mark Johnson gav e an 
example, “I’ll bet if  you go on YouTube today and type in, how to set a fire using 
whatever or how to build a bom b, you are going to find videos on there that tell 
you that and some could be . . . in  the (department’s) region or city.” 83  A 
contractor can set up a web crawler to lo ok for these kinds of  materials in a 
particular area or nati onwide.  The intell igence unit would need to review thes e 
materials to see if they have any value.  However, this level of s ophistication is 
probably beyond the scope and abilities of most fire department analytical units. 
2.   Internal Resources 
There is another source of infor mation for the intelligence unit that shoul d 
not be ignored.  That is the member s of one’s own department.  The 316,950 
professional and 823,950 volu nteer firefi ghters in t he United States enter 
thousands of buildings  on a daily basis. 84  Firef ighting personnel enter  
residences, factories, warehous es and ap artment buildings for  fires, medical 
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emergencies, utility emergencies (gas, electric, water), and to accomplish 
building inspections.  “Unlike police,  firefighters and emer gency medical 
personnel are not required to obtain a warrant to enter a building.” 85  Each of 
these inspections and responses is a potent ial opportunity to gather intelligence 
on terrorists who may be operating wit hin the lo cal community.  George 
Friedman of Stratfor stated, “I regard firemen not policemen as the first l ine of  
intelligence across the board.” 86  For instanc e in April 2005, in the course of a 
routine building inspection in Brooklyn New York, members of the F.D.N.Y. found 
more than 200 airbags in the basement of a food market that also had 
newspaper clippings about Osama bin Laden and beheadings in Iraq cov ering 
the walls.87  Now, purportedly this incident wa s not related to terrorism; howev er, 
in addition to the obv ious clippings, fire fighters realized that  airbags contain an 
explosive charge, sodium azide, which could be used by terrorists. 
The important point here is that info rmation received by the fire service 
and diss eminated by the local department’s  intelligence un it increases  its  
situational awareness, thereby, increasing its ability to recognize terrorist activity.  
In addition, there may also be times when  federal or local police agenc ies have 
specific things they desire a loc al fire  department to be look ing out for in the 
course of its normal duties.  Firefi ghters and EMS per sonnel must have a clear  
reporting mechanism  for any information collected.  The department’s  
intelligence unit or intelligence officer is the natural choice for this liaison function.   
The intelligence unit also needs  to work with the departm ent’s training 
division in order to instruct firefighters on what they should look for or perhaps  
the unit needs to do the training directly.  “Firefighter’s c an be plugged into the 
training regime and you (the intelligence unit) can do annual re freshers, you can 
do quarterly updates,  what’s  new and ov erseas bom bing overs eas and ot her 
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events.  You (the intelligence unit) may see trends and y ou have got to 
communicate with the people . . . ”88  A firefighter cannot co llect information if he 
or she does not know what to seek.  
Another aspect of a fire department’s collection is human intelligence .  
Again, running agents and inf ormants on t he street is not what is being 
recommended here.  What is recommended is that firefighters be trained to 
report what they hear on the street if it involves potential terrorist activity.  George 
Friedman commented that if he were in charge of a fire department intelligence 
unit, “I would create . . . a human inte lligence net work.  And for me a fire 
department is superbly located.   It’s in the community, it ’s in ev ery community.  
It’s a non-threatening entity and  your people (firefig hters) have constant  daily  
interactions with the c ommunity includ ing stakeholders in the community, whic h 
would not just be gang members, (but) people who own stores and so on.”89  The 
difference here is one of actively r unning an intelligence oper ation versus a 
firefighter knowing enough to report what they hear passively. 
People might well be willing to talk to firefighters who are not willing to talk  
to the police.  The community should know that they can talk to firefighters if they 
suspect terrorism.  “The cops are feared.   I’m afrai d of them.  Firemen are 
benign.  T hey’re the people who come to your house when you’ve had a heart 
attack.  They’re the people who will sa ve your kids when t hey have done 
something really stupid climbing up somewhere.” 90  This is not to say that this  
trust should be abus ed; however, firefighters should be trained to listen.  “Your 
guys are in neighborhoods . . . where som ebody might tell you, ‘You know d on’t 
tell anybody but my c ousin is k ind of insane and I don’t know what he has in his  
bedroom, but it smells bad.’” 91  Firefighters should be tr ained and motivated to 
report something like this. 
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A department’s emergence medical response personnel should be trained 
as well.  They might see injuries t hat are unusual.  If terrorists are using 
chemicals to produce explosives or chemical warfare agents and something goes 
wrong, medical response pers onnel should  be trained to notice the atypica l 
injury.  Does the story behind t he injury match the injury; is the injury really  
weird?  On e interviewee asked, “Where does the (report  of) interesting wounds, 
the burns t hat don’t make sens e, acid burns that don’t make s ense, shrapnel 
wounds in the leg” get dire cted to?  “Because that’s how you are  going to find a 
terrorist cel l.  Some  - - is going to do something boneheaded with one of his  
systems, cause a fire, cause a wound to himself and so on.”92    
Multiple interviewees  emphasiz ed the im portance of having a clear  
reporting mechanism.  It might be as simple  as putting a poster on the wall of  the 
firehouse with a telephone num ber and most importantly  someone on the other 
end who c an answer  questions  or take the information. 93  The success of a 
department’s firefighters serving as extr a eyes and ears will on ly be successful if 
the local department “est ablishes a procedure and a format where firefighters 
would be able to know what to look for and how to report it.” 94  Some cities have 
such a system in place.  Again, the intell igence unit is the natural point of contact 
for these suspicious activity reports, espec ially since it might be able to fit  the 
report within the larger context of what is occurring with terrorism in the region 
and the world.  The intelligence unit, by the contacts they have previous ly made, 
should k now who to pass this informati on onto in the loca l police and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 
Several of the interviewees stress ed the need for the syst em to be simple 
and have a reward system in place.  This is not to sug gest cash rewards or the 
like; however, “they (depar tment personnel) need to know that what they are 
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doing matters.” 95  Ever y report gets a response.  Even if there is already an 
ongoing investigation and the fi re department intelligence unit c annot reveal the 
specifics of a cas e, the repor ting personnel still get an  individual telephone call 
from the unit thanking them for the repor t.  This tells depart ment personnel that 
someone is listening, someone is responding to their report.  They are not  
wasting their time.  Failure to respond will cause the failure of this effort.  If the 
process is not simple or firefighters nev er hear anything back on the reports they  
file, “people aren’t going to take the time  or they’ll d o it once and say screw  
this.”96   
However, this is not  to say that  fi refighters should become intelligence 
agents for the federal government or polic e officers.  This would create both 
constitutional and public relations probl ems.  In November 2007, the American 
Civil Liberties Union attacked the FDNY fo r its reported “traini ng” in intelligence 
gathering.  The ACLU spokes person asked do we want people “t o fear the fire 
department as well as  the police.”97  While the question is unfair, it does contain 
a word of caution.  The fire service mu st remain scrupulous ly within the lim its of 
the law wh ile still perf orming this vital f unction.  Of course , a “fire department 
must guard against drifting into law-enforcement activities – namely, investigating 
crimes and apprehending criminals.”98  Indeed, even with meti culous attention to 
the legal is sues, there may be a political  backlash to a closer relationship with 
police and federal intelligence agencies.  Nevertheless, terrorism prevention is  
clearly a part of the fire service’s life safety mandate.   
There is another downside to firefighter s acting as intelligence c ollectors.  
There would need to be a com mitment to training fir e department personnel in 
the recognition of the signs of potential te rrorist activity.  This would require a 
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portion of a department’s limited training time that one could argue would be 
better spent preparing for fires and emergenc ies.  Nevertheless , whatever the 
public relations problem, and whatever t he necessary commitment of resources,  
they must not deter the fire service fr om exchanging lawful information with other 
agencies.  Such a two-way passing of infor mation and intelligenc e helps the fire 
service to fulfill its sworn duty to protect its citizens, their fellow first responders, 
and themselves from a terrorist incident.  Secondarily, a local fire department 
must protect the property and economic re sources of its community.  The fire 
service’s obligation to “protect life and property” supersedes any potential 
downside t o firefighters keeping their eyes  open in  the course  of their normal 
duties. 
In summary, a fire department intelli gence unit collec ts information from 
multiple sources.  Its sta ff forms relationships with personnel in other agencies in 
support of its mission.  John McCreary said  of this unit, “What you guys have to 
do is set up a liaison core.” 99  The intelligence unit should not just be sitting in an 
office.  In addition, it uses online resour ces supplied by the lo cal fusion center, 
the Department of Homeland Security , and federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agenc ies to find applicable ma terial.  They obtai n information from 
the members of their own department.  Collection is a function that requires  
imagination and adaptability.  Imagination is the only  limit to where and wha t 
types of information can be collected. 
D.   ANALYSIS 
Intelligence is more than just gathered fa cts.  An analyst is more than just 
a person who collects information and passes it along to someone els e.  The 
analyst or analytical team must know what  is important to the people or  the 
organization they serve.  With  this in  mind, they col lect information and add 
value.  The value they add is their ow n expertise.  They add depth of meaning 
and insight.  More than just facts, they try to give an understanding of what these 
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facts could mean to their consumers.  How does this individual or team help a fire 
department manager?  Fred Bur ton posited, “I  don’t have time to read . . . 25 
different websites and six different E-ma il providers a day.  So, your analyt ical 
shop, your  intelligence div ision, for exam ple, could pr ovide you  with some very 
concise warning and indicators, informati on as to what you should be thinking 
about, not only from a tactical perspective, but a strategic perspective.”100 
1.  Uncertainty 
This does not imply ther e is only one possible explanation of what some 
piece of information could mean; some times there may be sev eral competing 
explanations for a set of facts.  An efficient  group of analysts may explain the 
strongest possibilities and discuss the implications of each.  Additionally, in most 
cases, there will be in complete data on a pa rticular topic.  This does not mean 
that an analyst should not evaluate the existing information, but it does mean that 
they should convey the level uncertainty.  “One way to help convey uncertainty is 
to identify in the analysis the is sues about which there is unc ertainty or the 
intelligence that is essentially missing but which would, in the analyst’s view, 
either resolve the unknowns or c ause him to reexamine currently held views. ”101  
How does  a local fire depar tment do all of this?  W here does it obtain the 
requisite analytical expertise? 
2.   Team Approach 
Almost all interviewees agreed that a team approach to analysis would be 
the ideal way of proceeding.  Mar k Johnson said, “I think at some point you have 
to have a human analyst who knows fire,  knows the fire fighting trade, industry, 
and maybe teamed up with someone who knows  the in telligence industry. ”102  
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Pat Miller reported, “You w ill h ave to bring in som eone with an intellig ence 
background, I think, in order to do it right.”103  Why should this be so?   
Setting up interdisciplinary teams is  a method that we often use to 
tackle tough questions.  In fact, to ca rry it out into the ultimate . . . 
the National Counterterrorism C enter is an interdisciplinary team.   
You’ve got FBI analysts up there, you’ve got CIA case officers who 
run spies overseas; you’ve got  CIA analy sts who are experts in 
cultural things, You’v e got DIA people who specialize in military  
intelligence, and you’ve got a whole host of others.  So, I think that 
(the) principle is applicable at all le vels down to a fir e department.  
You need both, you need it all.104 
No one person can know it all; that is why the team approach is a good paradigm 
for fire service intelligence.  John McCreary, an exper ienced intelligenc e 
professional said, “I’d have to work, sit with a knowledgeable firefighter,” I’d have 
“to learn from him as  well as see if  I can apply what you need to know.” 105  A 
team approach is  ideal; however, it is no t the only  approach, espec ially if a loc al 
department does not have the resources to include an outside intelligence 
analyst. 
How, then, does a department choose fi re personnel to place into an 
intelligence team?  What qualities does one look for in a potential analyst chosen 
from within a fire department?  Choos ing the right person is es pecially important 
for a department that may not have any one with an intelligenc e background 
available either from wit hin or from outside the department.  The most basic 
answer is to choose for quality of mind.  Irrespective of all other qualific ations, 
department leadership has to l ook at the intellectual qua lities of t he indiv idual.  
Obviously, the individual would also have to have an interest in the intelligenc e 
field, and certainly, expe rtise in certain f ields su ch as improvised explosiv e 
devices would increase the value of an individual to a department.   
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A department could make several erro rs in choos ing an analyst , as many  
firefighters may not be suitable for this role .  Firefighters, as a general rule, t end 
to be process oriented and this  is not the ideal way  to do intelligence.  One 
mistake would be to take a firefighter on light duty and “make him the analyst this 
month.  That’s a very good bureaucrati c move.  (Howev er), it doesn’t help 
generate y our intelligence products.” 106  Another error would be to choos e 
analysts by rank or seniority in a department.  “You could be successful at pulling 
it off if you had the right mindset and l eadership meaning if you selected not  
based on seniority, not based on Vinnie’s cousin . . . th row out your seniority, 
throw out your rank.  I’m not saying (don’ t) have a bos s,” but your lead analyst  
“may be 20 years younger than the people t hat ultimately would work in the 
unit.”107  In other words, a fire department  needs to make a caref ul choice o f 
individuals, ones with the right qualities, irrespective of extrinsic factors. 
There are many positive qualities a department should look for in 
personnel assigned to this enterprise.   
If I was hiring someone for you, if  I pulled them from the ranks I 
would look  for qualities of curiosity, curiosity would be a major  
quality, curiosity, determination.  They want to get to the answer but 
also independence of thought; they don't necessarily go along with 
the crowd and I would want them to be pretty circumspect about 
things.  I am not looking for the loner off in the corner who quietly . . 
. does his  job but I'm also not looki ng for t he office fly who is just 
constantly . . . circulating aroun d the office yakking it up with his  
buddies.  I am looking for someone in between, someone who's got 
a pretty solid analytical head on t heir shoulders, but they als o talk 
to others.  They are not intimidat ed by rank necessarily  or position; 
they're looking at everything in a pretty cool-headed logical fashion 
but with an . . . awarene ss of, we are all politica l animals, we live in 
political organizations and . . . you have to follow the direction of the 
organization that you are working inside.108   
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Other interviewees also stressed the need to look for the ind ividual with curiosity, 
and imagination; one looks for the invetera te reader.  They should be the kind of 
people that the department gi ves a problem to go at it  with determination; they  
“love brainstorming all day,” gnawing on the problem. 109  They should not b e 
“boss fighters,” but also not easily cowed by rank.  Lastly, they need to be self-
confident in that if they were wor king with outside analysts they would have to be 
comfortable working with peop le who are smarter than t hen they are on certain 
subject matter. 110  George Friedm an recommended p eople who “love sitting a t 
computer screens . . . and discerning patterns.”111   
The supervisor of this unit needs  to be able to guide and be patient with 
these pers onality types.  He or she also needs to be ab le to k eep the un it on 
track, again determination, leadership, and the ability to get t he best out of team 
members is required.   Especially in th e early stages, the super visor is goin g to 
need to assure things are getting done.   The department and poss ibly the 
municipal government will be watching to see what this unit is doing.  It cannot be 
allowed to sit around thinking great t houghts; it needs to produce useful 
intelligence products. 
And the person that guides  them doesn’t necessarily have to be a 
professional analyst; it has to  be just somebody interested in 
getting the mission done, a mis sion-oriented supervisor.  And that 
person would say  . . . , “Over t he course of 90 days  here, we’r e 
going to do something that has  never been done before here within 
(this fire department).  We’re goi ng to create an intelligence 
department to help us  and to save our coll eagues’ lives.  And the 
first thing we’re going to look at  is this.  Now, ho w are we going to 
go about getting that done?  And, oh, by t he way, we need this  
done by, if this is a Monday, we need a completed project with your  
suggestions by Wednesday.112 
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So how might a department sea rch fo r the  right people?  First off, open 
the unit up to all the personnel in a department whether they are uniformed 
members of the department, professional staff or civilians.  The idea is to have as 
wide a pool of applic ants as possible.  One interv iewee sa id, “I would solic it 
requests for an extremely bright  individual with good writing sk ills with the abilit y 
to rapidly assess and process data.  That  person would need to take in not only  
the “granular and tactical data, but recognize the importance of strategic data.”113      
Have the individual write a paper on so me homeland security topic that  
the department chooses and give them a very short time to do it.  The short lead-
time does two things.  It shows that a person is motivated and that they are 
adaptable.  Next, have the people the department has chosen work as a team.  “I 
would give them projects to work on.  And I would have them  operate with very 
little direction and very guidance at first.” 114  Again, this group is only going to be 
successful if they are self-motivated and adaptable.   
How does a department know if the per son they have placed into their 
intelligence unit is  going to be s uccessful?  George Friedman reported that it 
would be k nown in 90 days if an indiv idual were going to be a success in the 
intelligence unit.  “He’s going to  start giving you smart stuf f.  He’ going to tell you 
stuff you didn’t know.  Okay at first, he’s only going to do it once or twice but a 
man that can give it to you once or twice can give you more.  And if in 90 days he 
can’t tell you anything you didn’t know, he won’t in 2000 (days).” 115  Therefore, a 
department should in itially assign a member to an intellige nce unit for a 90-day  
probationary period.   
This chapter discuss es the adaptabili ty required by  members of a fire 
department intelligenc e unit.  W hy should  this be necessary?  Many of those 
interviewed warned against “process” in analysis.  In other words, having hard 
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and fast rules about how do acc omplish the tasks given to an intelligence unit is  
counterproductive.  M r. Johnson reported, “You know, from bas ic training on up 
you’re kind of shoved inside a box and told to operate in there and with 
intelligence you just can’t do that .  If y ou box people in with t oo many rules, and 
regulations, and standards t hen you lose free expres sion, you lose freethinking 
and  . . . innovative thinking.  What was (what) they said  after 9/11; the 
intelligence failure was one of imagination.”116  Get the intelligence team thinking 
differently, thinking analytically  from a strategic and tactical  perspective “not 
thinking regulation, not thinking process.”117 
Several of  those interviewed stated t hat this lack of  process might be 
uncomfortable for a local fire department ; fire departments tend to be process  
driven organizations.  Howe ver, as George Friedman  stated about not having a 
predictable analytic al proc ess does indeed “sometimes  creates chaos.   But, 
better chaos than disciplined failure.”118 
So far, this chapter has discuss ed what to look for in a firefighter who is  
being cons idered for an analytic al unit, but  where does a fire department get a 
professional analyst to hel p in this effort?  There ar e many ways.  First, the 
department may be able to us e grant money to hire an analyst.  The analyst can 
mentor the firefighters coming into the uni t.  That way if the grant money runs 
out, the department already has a pool of trained mem bers who can then mentor 
other firefighters.  If this is not possi ble, look within the department for people 
who might have a military intelligence bac kground.  T hese individuals would not 
have to make a life-long commitment to th e analys is unit.  They could, inst ead, 
mentor other firefighters who wer e interested in this work.  If the department is 
close to a military facility, talk to the commanding officer as there might be retired 
military intelligence p eople loca lly who mig ht voluntee r to help.  Pat Miller, the 
Chief of Police in Ventura, California obtained analytical a ssistance this way.  ”I 
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knew there were retired Navy  people ar ound here so we went  out to the base 
and the admiral gave us some names.  And we called these guys and they were 
more than happy to help us out.  They co me in and (do) . . . mostly open source 
stuff but they still have clearances so they are still ab le to see stuff and they do a 
great job.  They collect and write brief papers.”119   
The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) is an educational 
organization of approximate ly 4,000 current and former intellige nce 
professionals.  T he membership of the As sociation is  spread ac ross the United 
States.  Leveraging the above idea, t he Association was c ontacted by the 
researcher to see if they would be wi lling to act as a resource for fire 
departments that desired volunt ary assist ance in for ming an in telligence unit.  
The Executive Director, Elizabeth Bancro ft, graciously offere d the assistance of 
the Assoc iation.  If a fire department c ontacts her at  (703) 790-0320, she will 
notify members of the Associat ion who live in that area.  If a local member of the  
Association is intere sted in h elping, they can then contact the local fire 
department.  Similarly, the Armed Fo rces Communications  and Elec tronics 
Association (AFCEA International), an or ganization of 31,000, offered their 
assistance to fire departments that are beginning an intelligence unit.  Their point 
of contact i s Mr. Steven Ritchey , Vice Pr esident for Intellig ence.  Mr. Ritchey’s  
phone number is (703)  631-613.  His e- mail address is sritchey@afcea.org.  If 
none of these resources is available in  a particular locale, do without  the 
intelligence professional; train personnel from within your department.  If none of 
these resources is available in a parti cular locale, do without  the intelligence  
professional; train personnel from within the department.   
Balance is  also required in an analytic  unit.  The smaller the gr oup, the 
more critical it is to pick the right individuals.  If only have three people . . . and all 
three are gregarious and outgoi ng  then the unit is goin g to be known for, you 
know, these guys make all k inds of noi se, they’re always sending out memos,  
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this and that, but what the hell do they kn ow?  Or on the other hand, if you hire 
three guys who are studious and quiet, and you know shrinking violet types then, 
hello, did you hire anybody. 120  Since this thesis s uggests a small group of  
individuals, these few people will create th e unit’s personality.  It is important,  
then, not only to pick  t he individuals with the right mental abilities and writing 
skills, but also to pick the right balance of individuals. 
3.   Operations 
What is the analytical unit suppos ed to do for a department?  How should 
it be helping the local fire service organization prevent, respond to, and survive a 
terrorist attack?  A lot of information a nd intelligence is av ailable from federal 
agencies.  Still, more is available from state and loca l fusion centers.  The 
analytic unit or fire departm ent intelligenc e officer looks at all of this incoming 
information and sees  how it applies to the local fire department and the 
neighboring community.  Additionally, the unit looks at  the local c ommunity and 
asks how would terrorism affect a response to that building, to that factory, to that 
piece of infrastructure?  It looks at a department’s standard operating procedures 
and asks in light of what is known of terrorism, do they need to be changed,  and 
is it possible to make members safer.  The raison d’être of such a unit is to work  
for the safety of the members of a depar tment, their fellow first responders, and 
the citizens of the community they serve. 
“Every significant terrorist event is  reported somewhere in the  world.” 121  
Who is looking at these attacks, looking fo r the lessons learned, and asking what 
are the implications are fo r this department?  “That’s t he way you learn, you go 
from hindsight to foresight.” 122  The intelligence officer or unit attempts to predict  
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the results if that attack happened in  their c ommunity.  Within larger  
communities, even different neighborhoods  ma y face different threats.  Fred 
Burton gave an example of how this local analysis might work. 
If I was trying to make this argument to the FDNY chief in New York 
and okay we know NYPD has  this ring of steel in Wall Street or 
wherever it’s deploy ed.  What does  that mean to me as (the 
department) responsible for emergency services in the area?  Does 
this mean that thinking of this from an analytical pers pective, now 
the bad guys won’t look at this ar ea; therefore, w here would they 
go?  Where are the other softer ta rget areas that perhaps I need to 
be made aware of?  I n the event we  do have a call f or service in 
this “ring of steel,” do I automatica lly dispatch . . . a full box alarm 
assignment versus just a first du e engine company?  I mean thes e 
are the kinds of things that an analytic shop could game board and 
give you s ome potential options or  some alternative analysis as to 
other things you should be thinking of.123  
Additionally, the analysis unit should be the people who answer the phone when 
field companies or EMS units discover thin gs they consider suspicious and need 
to ask questions.  They should be look ing at reports.  A department needs 
somebody who is really look ing at terro rism around the world to answer phones  
or correlate reports.124 
This unit needs to as k the tough questions of a department, are they  
prepared?  The intelligence unit, possibly in conjunction with the area’s polic e 
department and loc al Protective Security  Advisor should make of a list of  
potential t errorist targets.  Look at the top 50 pot ential targets; it is not an 
insurmountable number. 125  The unit looks  at the current fire departmen t 
response and asks if t here were a terrorist  attack on this target, how would the 
response need to c hange?  Where would water be obtained?  How would 
members and the public be  protected?  What if there were multiple attacks, how  
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would resources be obtained?  This is not new; fire departments have been 
doing target hazard planning for years, this unit does the same thing except 
though the lens of terrorism. 
The analytic unit needs to look  at a community through the eyes of a 
terrorist.  Often, homeland se curity analysts look at vu lnerabilities.  Exploring 
vulnerabilities may not be the best way to discover potential targe ts for response 
planning.  Just because a pot ential infrastr ucture tar get is vulnerable does  not  
mean a terrorist is interested in it.  “What  do they lik e to attack?  They go for 
sensational targets – headli nes – not for fundamental and revolutionary change.   
If it is poss ible to see through terrorist eyes  at what they would like to attack if 
they had their druthers, one would find it does not look  like the lis t of vulnerable 
targets that law abid ing analysts identify.” 126  Therefore, another way to look at  
potential targets is through the use of attractors.  “Because that is the only  
relevant starting point.  What do they (the terrorists) see as v iable, an attractiv e 
target?  So, we developed . . . a set of attractors.” 127  “We used 36 of the most  
sensational attacks in  the world to come up with this alternative” to critical 
infrastructure vulnera bilities.128  T he attractors this research found were the 
following.   
• Visibility – sensational press 
• Essentiality – lack of workarounds 
• Occupied -- lots of people 
• Accessibility – easy to get to 
• Inter related – Multiple effects and big bang for the buck 
• Symbolism – psychological impact129 
This list a ssists in looki ng at targeting from the ey es of an adversary; fire 
department analysts need to do the same thing.   
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In summary, analysis  is performed by  a small group of dedic ated and 
mentally flexible individuals , three to four at most. 130  “You ‘righ t size’ it (th e 
analytical unit) by as king the question how  do I make certain that everything I  
receive . . . is seen by a sm all enough group that they c an collate it.”  Bigger is  
not better.  It is better to have two people  who know all the facts than ten people 
who each know one f act.  In any event, this unit should have a steady supply of 
information coming in, and analyze it to see how or if it applies to the l ocal 
community.  These units should look at attacks around the world for lessons that 
can be used by the local fire department.  They should look at potential targets in 
the community and plan a fire department’s response; they should be available to 
answer questions from field units and ma ke contacts with other agencies in the 
area that are inv olved with homeland security.  Analysis should support  
preparedness and pre-planning in a department.131  Ultimately, by their research 
and planning, they protect life and property in their local community. 
E.   DISSEMINATION 
1.  Information Transfer 
The method of dissemination is the one place in the intelligence cycle for a 
fire department’s intelligence shop not to be imag inative.  Almost all of those 
interviewed recommended that  an intelli gence office act through existing 
processes.  This is especially true as an intelligence office comes on line;  later 
the office may tweak the system, but it is  initially easier to  go through existing 
communication pathways.  Mark Johnson st ated, “So I would try to do it through 
the existing (communications pr ocesses), you don't want to necessarily s et up a 
brand new information sharing process.   That may or may not be adv isable 
depending on the situation but in general, most organizations, mature  
 
 
                                            
130 George Friedman, interview by author, transcript, Austin, Texas, November 19, 2008. 
131 “Fire Department Intelligence Officer,” FDSOA Safety-Gram 15 (February 2007): 1.  
 64
organizations . . . already have their set way of doing things and trying to change 
it is sometimes not pretty.” 132  In other words, do not mak e waves where waves 
are not necessary.  Use the communication pathways that already exist. 
A fire department intelligence unit needs to be discreet.  Not all 
information should be sent to all member s of the department.  The intelligence 
unit will need to dec ide what intelligence is useful for the higher echelo ns of the 
department and what should g o to the field companies.  Intelligen ce that affects 
situational awareness  should be sent to all levels of the department.  In the 
Ventura Police Department, “we leave it to that (TLO) se rgeant to decide if they 
are going to put that out to the troops or do a training bulletin or do some k ind of 
notice or s omething t hat uh he feels or she feels is would be  valuable for the 
street officer and then do through briefing s you know roll calls  and things like 
that.”133   
George Friedman recommends that the intelligence unit have “a method 
for disseminating it (in telligence) not only to the fire department but to the polic e 
department as well so that  they can be alerted.” 134  It is also important to pass  
the information along t o other parts of t he department other than the field units.  
For instance, fire inspectors should be included bec ause they are in various  
premises and are potentially valuable sour ces of add itional information, if they  
know what they are s eeking.  Another div ision of th e department that should be 
included in the information flow is trai ning.  Correct and up to date information 
should appear in training scenarios and training bu lletins.  Though discr eet, 
dissemination should be as  wide ranging as  is necessary for the intelligence unit  
to fulfill its duty to protect life and property.        
                                            
132 Mark Johnson, interview by author, transcript, Washington, D.C., November 4, 2008. 
133 Pat Miller, interview by author, transcript, South Bend, Indiana, November 22, 2008. 
134 George Friedman, interview by author, transcript, Austin, Texas, November 19, 2008. 
 65
2.  Feedback 
Along with the written materials, t he intelligence unit is disseminating 
some type of feedback form that should be included.  It does not matter if the 
dissemination is electronic or paper, the consumer should have a chance to give 
comments on the materials received.  Th is is a form of quality c ontrol.  
Remember the whole point of  this intelligence process is to support the 
consumer of the product.  If there is no fe edback pro cess, an in telligence unit  
until never improve the products  it is putting  out.  “For each article that we (the 
Open Source Center) put up on our web s ite anyone reading that can res pond 
and ask a question, make a statement, w hatever and once they hit the send 
button it comes to our customer service team who are not the experts but they  
will immediately pass it off to the aut hor or someone else who knows about the 
subject matter.” 135  An intelligenc e unit should not be afraid to ask if their  
materials were useful or how they could be improved. 
Moreover, the feedback proc ess allows consumers of intelligenc e to ask  
questions on the materials presented.  One of the purposes of an intelligence unit 
is to educate the department they serve.  Any request for additional information 
on the materials disseminated should be welcom ed and be given a rapid 
response.  If an intelligence unit does not have the information at hand, so inform 
the consumer right away.  Then try to  find the information requested.  Being 
responsive earns a lot of good will for the intelligence unit. 
Part of the feedbac k process is al so t o ask the department’s senior  
managers and its firefighters what they  feel they need to know.  What 
information, what intelligence in their mind is lack ing?  Leave a space on t he 
feedback form asking what the consumer w ould want to know about or feel is  
lacking in their understanding of terrorism.  Bear in mind, the intelligence cycle is 
a cycle; the process is iterat ive.  The issues departme nt personnel want or need  
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to know about are really nothing other than new requirements.  Requirements 
are, of course, the first step of the intelligence cycl e.  These new requirements  
cause a new cycle of collection and the process continues.    
 67
IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.   TRAINING 
Every person interviewed stressed the need for firefighters in the 
intelligence unit to be properly trained.  The interviewees may not have all agreed 
on how best to train a firefighter; howbei t, training was stressed as one of the 
most important factors in the success of  a fire department intelligence project.  
The methodologies ranged from  mentoring to formal cla ssroom training.  F ormal 
training can come from government or from academia, whereas mentors may be 
volunteers with an int elligence background coming out  of the loc al community or 
a vendor hired for a limited period.  Agai n, a department should not forget to see 
if they have personn el wit h a military intelligence b ackground who migh t be 
willing to assist in the effort. 
1.   Formal Instruction 
One good resource for training is the Open Source C enter outside of 
Washington, D.C.  Mark Johnson of the Open Source Center reported, “We offer 
training and we hav e a whole c atalog of  courses and perhaps a dozen of them  
are relevant to a person like at  a fire  department.  We teach analytical, basic 
analytical methods and adva nced analytical met hods.”136  T he courses  
themselves are free of charge.  T he local fire department pays as sociated travel 
costs. 
Also at the federal level,  the Department of Homela nd Security’s Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis offers training.  The DHS “Intelligence Training Branch . 
. . has begun to develop homeland secu rity-centric courses  for our DHS 
intelligence personnel and our  state, lo cal and tribal partners at our own 
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Homeland Security In telligence Tr aining Center in As hburn, Va.” 137  The Basic 
Intelligence and Thre at Analys is Course (BITAC) is  a five-we ek course  that 
awards a Homeland Security Intelligenc e Officer designation.  Fire depart ment 
personnel may take these cours es at no cost and grant money  may be provided 
to cover travel costs.  
There may also be training available at a state or local level.  For instance, 
the Department of Homeland Security offers courses in  open source intelligence 
through the State and Fusion Center Program office.138  These programs provide 
training in open source tradecraft.  “We ca ll it tradecraft, it's how to analyze, how  
to evaluate sources, it's bas ically teaching you common sense methods in 
understanding the information coming at y ou and separating the fluff from the 
real, (find) the good stuff and then taking all those bits of information, laying them 
out on the table and then writing, describing what it is you are reading there, what 
are you seeing there and are th ere any judgments to be gained f rom that, and . .  
. where to get information.” 139  Some states may have a Terrorist Liaison Officer 
program available.  Pat Miller recommended that  dep artments “train some 
firefighters as Terrorist Liaison O fficers” as a good way to start an intelligen ce 
program.140 
In addition, there are university program s that train people in int elligence.  
Mark Johnson stated,  
There are a number of univ ersities and colleges  that have 
established intelligenc e educational  curriculum.  One that stands  
out in my mind is Michigan State University, Dr. Dave Carter, he 
teaches c onstantly.  He is c onstantly on the road at police 
departments nationwide teaching open source methods, 
intelligence methods.  He wrote papers on intelligenc e . . . these 
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sorts of topics.  So (you have t he) Open So urce Center at the 
federal lev el and then you got a few colleges and universities, 
Michigan State, I think Penn Stat e has some, New Mexic o, I heard 
about an intelligence program up there.141   
There are also formal on-line training  programs available.  Fred Burton 
pointed out that the Bush  School at Texas A&M has an on-line Homeland 
Security Department. 142  Henley-Putnam University is accredited and is highly  
recommended.  
Henley-Putnam has got the best tactical training courses that I have 
ever seen in an online format.  A nd the FBI (and), fo r example, all 
the agent s assigned as ATF  ana lysts, have rec ognized this 
program as (the) one.  If (FBI agent s) want to take the courses  
there online, the FBI will pay for it.  And,  I mean they have 
(relevant) courses, courses, y ou know, not like English 101 or 
Writing 101.  They have . . . Surv eillance Detection Training . . .  
Strategic Analysis, Tactical Anal ysis courses, How Do You Do a 
Threat Assessment.  And so, they’ve got s ome very good cours es 
that also come with very good in structors and very good training 
manuals that, you know, and books and so forth that you get  to 
refer back to.143 
These types of programs are of great benefit in a busy world because fire 
department members can take courses in analysis in an on-line format. 
2.   Mentoring 
Several of those interviewed recomm ended mentoring as the best way of 
training fire department members as anal ysts.  The idea would be th at fire 
personnel would bec ome a good analyst by wo rking directly with and learning 
from a good analysts.  George Friedman suggested, “The best way to train these 
guys is to attach them to an analyst doin g work and make them his  assistant for 
three months.  You know go get me coffee,  go Xerox this, go check this fact out,  
go check that fact out.  And then you see it’s really a master craftsman working 
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as apprentice.  And in due c ourse he becomes quite good.” 144  Some successful 
private intelligence agencies tr ain their new analysts in this  fashion; they believe 
mentoring is superior to formal training because their new analysts learn to avoid 
the restrictive hard and fast rules of the American intelligence community.145   
There are several ways a mentoring program could be initiated by a 
department.  As was written earlier, a department may have internal resources 
such as former military intellig ence veterans who might mentor personnel in a n 
intelligence unit.  The first step, then, is  to check within one’s own department.  
The next step is to check one’s community.  Are there military facilities that might 
help put a department in touch with retir ed intelligence officers?  Lastly, as 
mentioned previously, several intelligence associations have offered to set-up an 
intelligence mentor with a local fire department.        
B.   KEEPING IT REAL 
Many of the interviewees stressed the need for a new analysis unit to 
“keep it real.”  Though this was mention ed before, it is wo rth repeatin g, the 
intelligence produced by the new unit must be related to the operations of that 
department.  It has to have c lear value.  If city or depar tment administrators are 
to support this project, they must see r eal value.  Real value comes from the 
analysis u nit improving their department.  If the intellig ence produced is not 
actionable, the unit will loose s upport.  “Write what the department needs.   You 
might do great writing, but it’s not on a topic that anyone needs it is worthless.”146  
Similarly, John McCreary commented on t he intelligence generated by a fire 
department intelligence unit, “There is real value to this if there is information that 
is relevant to your mission.”147 
                                            
144 George Friedman, interview by author, transcript, Austin, Texas, November 19, 2008. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 John McCreary, interview by author, transcript, Washington, D.C., November 25, 2008. 
 71
Look at areas in the department that have a potential to fail in the event o f 
a terrorist attack, work at improv ing those areas.  Do the homework.  If it is  not 
known, then admit as such.  Do not make  up answer s.  “Credibility is gold en, if 
you don’t know, say so.  Try to find the ans wers.”148  Once an intelligence un it’s 
credibility is gone, it is dea d in the water.  Chances are it will never get its  
credibility back.   
If an intelligence unit  does good analysis and writing , it will be noticed.   
“When your intelligence depar tment writes something that probably would be 
unusual, but in many ways brilliant, the battalion chief when he reads that report . 
. . is going to say, ‘Wow.  I want more of  that.’  And word of mouth itself would 
grow that secti on (analysis  unit).” 149  Keep the unit’s  research real, keep it  
relevant, and keep it credible.  I f a department is going to form an intelligence 
unit or even if it is only one intell igence officer, Fred Burton summarized the 
mandate of this initial phase of the pr oject well, when he said, “You have a 
limited window to impress.  Don’t waste it.”150    
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V.   CONCLUSIONS 
A.   PROPOSITIONAL MODEL 
The research shows  there are def initive relations hips between the 
Aggregated Second Order Codes.  First, the entire fire intelligence process must 
be surrounded with integrity and usefulness.  These are the same values  that 
govern the fire service on a day-to-day basis.  These mandatory overarching 
values will keep the intelligence uni t in operation and supported by their  
department.  This  second order code is  called “Keeping it Real” and it encirc les 
all others.  Within that context, intelligence must be understood as a process and 
all the other aspects of the research are,  therefore, contain ed within the sec ond 
order code “Intelligence.”  The process begins with “Requirements.”  Someone or 
some committee must decide what a department needs to know.  Some 
interviewees recommended against a fo rmal requirement syst em and argued to 
allow the analysts themselves to decide what a department needs to know.   
Howbeit, some indiv idual or group of in dividuals must  make that determination 
and that is “Requirements.”   
From the requirement s, the intelligenc e unit  begins to bring together the 
requisite information and intelligence; this second order c ode is  c alled 
“Collection.”  The collected materials then undergo “ Analysis.”  The analy tical 
process is where an intelligence unit asks, among other questions, what does  
this fact or event mean to this particula r fire department.  Ho w will it affect 
operations?  Will it endanger citizens, firefi ghters, fellow first responders?  The 
analytical product is then sent out  to those who need the information it contains.  
This process comes under t he second order code “Dissemi nation.”  Part of the 
dissemination process is the allowance for feedback from the consumer.  The 
questions contained in the feedback may lead to ne w requirements.  “Training”  
improves the ability of the intelligence to recognize a department’s requirem ents.  




Figure 3.   Propositional Model 
B. INTELLIGENCE IN THE FIRE SERVICE 
Those interviewed in this study cl early understood the need for fire 
departments to have their own intelligence officers or units.  Everyone involved in 
this project was eager to help the fire  service develop the skills and systems 
necessary to execute this vital work bec ause they saw that need.  No one, not  
the fusion center, not the local police, not federal agency can understand what a 
piece of intelligence m eans to a particula r fire department with a particular set of 








that reason, every fire depar tment should have personnel trained in intelligence 
and informing their department on terrorism.  This is not just the conclus ion of 
this research. The Fire Department Safe ty Officers Associ ation (FDSOA) also 
recommends that every department  have an intelligence officer. 151  Terrorism 
threatens both the lives of the citizens a department is sworn to protect and the 
firefighters themselves.  Protecting li fe and property is the reason a fire 
department exists. An  intelligenc e officer or unit helps  a department fulfill that 
sworn duty.   
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